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This paper is based on a report commissioned by UNCTAD to serve
as an input for the 1986 Trade and Development Report. The views
expressed herewithin are solely those of the authors. Further-
more, the publication of this report should in no way be inter-
preted as official sanctioning or approval of the contents by
UNCTAD, nor should even tacit agreement by UNCTAD with the ap-
proach, analysis or conclusions be assumed.
The report itself attempts to shed some light on a subject which
is of paramount importance in international economics, but which
has been given surprisingly little attention. The approach taken
is based on mainstream economic thought, whereby every effort has
been taken to couch the text in terms understandable to informed
politicians, businessmen and laymen. This seemed to be essential
should the message embodied in this paper be easily absorbed. The
authors nonetheless admit that whether the message is accepted
depends - inter alia - on the willingness of the reader to allow
deductions from an eclectic approach to be generalized upon.
Despd/ti'e ?this weakness the authors hope that serious discussions
will be ifndoiped with the aim of improving the international allo-
cation of resources so as to increase the welfare of all parties
concerned. In light* of current or rather continuing financial
constraints faced by many developing countries, a more efficient
use of resources leading to higher income levels must surely be a
goal which can be generally agreed upon.
The authors would particularly like to thank Lutz Hoffmann and
his staff at UNCTAD for worthwhile comments. Likewise the parti-
cipants of a working seminar at UNCTAD, at which the initial re-suits were presented, also contributed with their comments and
criticisms in making this paper what it is. Indebtedness is due
for sure to Peter Fr6hler and John Gregory from UNCTAD who res-
ponded to the detailed data requests of the authors and skill-
fully produced the data required. Last but not least the unre-
lenting efforts of Christiane Schroder to decipher our pencilled
thoughts made this form of promulgation possible. Given the bur-
dens which they all carried it seems quite fair and just that
they also accept the responsibility for the contents. However,
not wanting to place any individual under undue duress, they are
all exonerated and the authors fully accept the usual responsi-
bility for the contents and possible errors therein - may they be
forgiven for the latter.
Bernhard Fischer
Kiel, June 1986 Dean Spinanger
A Note Concerning Set-up and Wording
In order to exemplify or digress on certain topics without dis-
rupting the train of thought "Boxes" - typed single space rather
than one and a half - have been used. The terms industrialized
(IC) and developed countries are synonymous; likewise the terms
industrializing and developing (DC)/less developed (LDC) coun-
tries are identical.Contents
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I. Prices, the Allocation of Production Factors and Trade
1. Introduction and Relevance
World trade flows have undergone changes in the last two decades
which transcend in a global context what would have belonged to a
feasible set of forecasts thirty years ago. Beyond a doubt, any
attempt in the mid-fifties "to pick the winners and losers" three
decades hence would have produced but few on-target estimates.
Even moving the vantage point up to the mid-sixties would hardly
have sharpened the perception for foreign trade developments in
the ensuing decades. It might be recalled, for instance, that a
rather pessimistic picture of the future was painted for the
countries described in an in-depth portrayal of Asian economies
(see Box 1) , which was researched and written in the mid-six-
ties . In the meantime some of those countries described in that
tome now belong to the set of the more successful developing
countries.
The conclusion (see final paragraph of Box 1) drawn from the
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above prediction but also from a sophisticated econometric fore-
cast of future world production patterns (see also Box 1) relates
directly to the topic of this paper: namely to yield evidence -
in connection with performance in world trade - on the relevance
of ensuring that domestic factor markets are relatively free from
influences which shift production away from comparative advant-
ages and ensuring that entrepreneurs are not significantly hin-
dered „in reacting to world market conditions due to foreign ex-
change/financial market restrictions. Underlying this entire
approach are principles (briefly outlined in Box 2) fundamental
As Little (1982, p. 390, footnote 17) points out, Myrdal's
Asian Drama was an implicit plea for planning, something he had
fervently advocated a dozen years earlier (Myrdal, 1956).
2
Singling out the Asian Drama does not imply that it alone erred
in underestimating the capability of developing countries to
successfully compete in world markets. Actually it is but one
of the many publications which is characteristic of an era in
development economics thinking: For an overview the interested
reader is referred to Meier, Seers (1985).- 2 -
to market or mixed economies, which place particular emphasis on
the economic role of prices in determining the demand for and
supply of labor/capital. To the extent that relative prices can
fulfill their role, they also clearly signal to entrepreneurs
where gaps between supply and demand exist or are developing.
Entrepreneurs for instance, in reacting to perceived supply
shortages, do so because they expect to be able to profit from
their engagements, but at the same time they are ensuring with
their actions that - barring other influences - the economic
potential of a country is being efficiently tapped.
In the Asian Drama, however, the ability of the price system to
function in accordance with the principles of market economies
was implicitly doubted. Or rather the ability of entrepreneurs
in developing countries to react to world market conditions and
to direct resources into profitable or more profitable activities
2 was - if not doubted - at least neglected or underestimated .
While the existence of economic incentives alone is not necessa-
rily a sufficient condition to induce an economy to move down a
certain development path, their crucial role was already beginn-
ing to be appreciated in the mid-sixties. Since then, a wealth of
systematically collected information of comparable nature has
been gathered on development strategies from a wide range of
individual countries. In essence these studies show a clear pic-
ture of the positive impact that competition has in ensuring an
efficient allocation of resources. Thereby competition with for-
eign counterparts is often viewed as the acid test for establish-
ing the economic viability of ongoing businesses. This being the
case it is thus logical that opening the economy to outsiders -
either through decreasing or rather eliminating protection (be it
See e.g. Leibenstein (1966) on the importance of incentives in
providing crucial impulses for development.
2
The conclusions drawn in the Asian Drama can be deduced as
resting on very inelastic supply and demand reaction functions.- 3 -
for imports or import substitutes) - is considered by mainstream
economists to be the most efficient means of remaining or becom-
ing competitive .
However, between an outward-oriented economy and one which is
virtually free of self-imposed distortions, a large gap exists.
Hence, the focal point of the ongoing debate about which path to
take centers around the appropriate policies aimed at closing
this gap. These discussions have unfortunately induced but few
empirical studies on the magnitude of factor market price distor-
tions and their ramifications vis-a-vis performance in world
trade or (in a broader sense) economic growth (see Krueger, 1984,
p. 555) . While it is the objective of this paper to attempt to
shed some additional light on the relevant issues at large, i.e.
in connection with factor market distortions and trade (see Box 2
for some crucial introductory remarks on this topic), it would be
presumptuous to consider the evidence to be anything more than
circumstantial. Caveats are thus due for two main reasons. First
of all, since distortions permeate all facets of the demand for
and supply of labor and capital, it is extremely difficult to
disentangle them in a manner to allow a clear-cut interpretation.
Secondly, other factors like shifts in demand, the magnitude of
political/social judgement factors, or intercountry social pref-
erence differentials, may change over time in an unknown manner
and thus mask over underlying trends.
Before the paper begins with a brief overview of trade trends, a
short digession is made on the relevance of the approach chosen.
Then trends in world trade are referred to, starting on a highly
aggregated level and descending to or rather abstracting from a
product level at which specific countries can be singled out. The
countries selected provide the basis around which the ensuing
analysis of labor and capital costs evolve. Given the lack of
reliable, in-depth and comparable data from a wide range of coun-
tries and industries, certain data requirements will be met with
an eclectic approach.
Such an approach, however, does not exclude infant industry
arguments under certain conditions.- 4 -
Box 1
A View from the Past of Yesterday, Today and the Future
Two books published just nine years apart (in the 60's and 70 *s)
dealt with the state of the world economy (or parts thereof) as
well (directly or indirectly) with its future . Issues were rais-
ed therein and conclusions drawn, which - if correct - would
imply wide-sweeping changes in trade and development trends. It
is thus worthwhile to briefly note (with all due respect to the
authors) what was said and how the books arrived at the results.
The first of the books, Asian Drama, paints a broad, multifaceted
picture of the socioeconomic state of the developing South and
Southeast Asian region. Aside from going into depth on manifold
aspects in the entire spectrum of countries, the conclusions
drawn from the extensive research are presented in the middle of
the study along 'with a set of conditions that excludes for the
most part ideologies' (p. 676). After determining that the region
is poorly endowed with natural resources, except for coal and
iron ore in India and oil only in Indonesia the consequences
thereof for the region are explained: "The fact that some coun-
tries have succeeded in creating a flourishing industry, mainly
by importing raw materials - notably Switzerland, Denmark and
Japan - does not necessarily mean that South Asia could readily
do the same" (p. 677) . Likewise the agricultural sector is seen
as having such low productivity/yields that foreign deficits in
food supplies will continue to expand. Furthermore, while point-
ing out how important export expansion in the past was for the
economic growth of present-day, highly developed countries, it is
stated that the epoch of rapidly growing export markets has end-
ed. Although exceptions were made for Malaya, if rubber could
compete with artificial rubber and Indonesia, if internal pro-
blems cou-ld be efficiently solved, the demand for exports from
the region - having shrunk relative to total world trade in re-
cent decades - was considered not to be bright. On top of this,
low income-demand elasticities and discriminatory tariffs were
seen as hampering the development of export industries and for
those few export industries which existed and produced cheap, low
quality manufactures the world market was not considered to be
expanding. Since underdevelopment was characterized by rigidity
and lack of adaptability and since the entrenched industries in
the highly developed countries "enjoyed" markedly superior condi-
tions, the possibility of building up a manufacturing industry to
successfully compete on world markets seemed to be severely li-
mited. In concluding it is noted that being a late-comer in the
nineteenth century was not a disadvantage (and quite often an
advantage), in the twentieth century "it is a serious disadvan-
tage".
1 The two books are: Myrdal, Asian Drama (1968) and Leontief, The
Future of the World Economy (1977).- 5 -
The second of the two books, The Future of the World Economy, was
published during a period still very much influenced by the first
wave of energy price increases. One major purpose of the study
was to deal with the impact of prospective economic issues (which
also included environmental aspects) on the economic outcome of
the second UN Development Decade. As opposed to the Asian Drama's
verbal forecasting, The Future of the World Economy was an at-
tempt to depict and forecast the world economy by applying ma-
thematical methods integrated into a global model. The approach
was based on input-output analysis and the model disaggregated
into 15 regions, each with 45 sectors of economic activities.
Each of the regions is treated separately, but linked through a
complex system of 40 classes of goods and services, capital
flows, aid transfers and interest payments. After running through
a scenario based on extrapolation of international development
strategies targets to the year 2000 and determing that per capita
income differentials between developed and developing regions
would remain at 12 to 1, the study runs through various scenarios
in which the income gap would be reduced by almost half at the
end of the century. Distilling out of the study and the various
scenarios the essence for industrialization policies, it can be
stated that the engine of growth in developing countries was ex-
pected to be heavy industries, whereby capital requirements are
seen as being met from domestic sources.
Without delving into the technical details and various assump-
tions of the model, it must be underlined that - as far as trade
and development issues are concerned - the model, despite every
attempt to account for economic realities - can hardly be used to
portray international trade relations, since, e.g. foreign trade
- determined by relative competitive positions - is not incorpo-
rated into the model as a driving force behind changes in the
international division of labor. Needless to say the basic as-
sumptions upon which the 1-0 model rests, leave little room for
taking into consideration policy-induced deviations from techni-
cally determined input-output coefficients, and thus ignore an
aspect responsible for massive misallocations in the world eco-
nomy .
To conclude: In both cases the role of prices or rather incen-
tives was not allowed to be fullfilled. Whereas in Asian Drama
they were either overlooked (as concerns natural resources),
declared not to be relevant anymore (as concerns importance of
foreign trade today) or not belonging to human capital potential
of Asian countries (as concerns the inability to react), in The
Future of the World Economy the mddel was simply not equipped to
capture such aspects.- 6 -
Box 2
Trade, Prices, the Structure of Production and Distortions
In today's seemingly disorderly world those in favour of liber-
alizing trade would seem to have the cards stacked against them.
After all, what better suggestion could be made for countries
still suffering from various shocks in recent years than to at-
tempt to ensure that international trade expands in more pre-
dictable paths? While the call for predictability is understand-
able, there is nonetheless little proof that it will assist coun-
tries with inherent economic problems like low overall growth
rates or lack of success in export markets. As a matter of fact
any number of centrally planned economies have shifted over to
more flexible foreign trade systems in an attempt to increase the
flexibility of their economies and subject protected sectors to
competitive impulses from the outside. If freer trade can actual-
ly be viewed as a measure to enhance economic development, then
the prime question about the conditions under which this should
take place must be asked.
Should the basic principle be accepted that an international
division of labour exists, from which each country can benefit
the most if it exports are in line with its comparative advan-
tages, then obviously those policies which ensure that the com-
parative advantages are efficiently tapped should be followed. In
more market-oriented economies this means that prices are allowed
to reflect relative scarcities and in doing so act to allocate
resources into those economic activities which yield the higher
returns. Given flexible entrepreneurs and an efficiently func-
tioning interfacing between the domestic and foreign sectors,
production will tend to specialize in those industries where
comparative advantages exist or rather develop. In this context
the degree to which comparative advantages are tapped depends
upon the degree to which labour and capital are combined in a
production process in line with their relative abundance in the
economy. Thus, if policies are enacted which cause the price of
one factor to increase relative to the other, then production
will be structured using more of the relatively cheaper factor,
thus shifting it away from the most efficient methods. Such re-
actions are assumed to hold true in this paper, since it deals
primarily with market or at least mixed economies, where prices
usually fulfill their intended functions.
Measures which influence the supply of or demand for factors of
production (as denoted above) are considered to distort produc-
tion away from efficient levels and are hence labelled "distor-
tions". A distortion is meant to be a neutral term in the sense
that it embodies no prejudgement on the specific intent of a
given policy instituted, it merely notes that a policy influences
relative prices and thus induces shifts in the demand for and/or
supply of a factor of production. For instance:- 7 -
- Policies which increase the profitability of the manufacturing
sector vis-^-vis agriculture will cause labour and capital to
migrate into the former.
- Interest rate subsidies will generally decrease the cost of
capital and thus shift demand to more capital intensive methods
of production.
- Legislating additional non-wage benefits for employees increas-
es the cost of labour relative to capital and thus promotes
more capital-intensive methods of production.
- Unemployment insurance can cause individuals to conclude that
being unemployed with not substantially less take-home pay is
actually an acceptable substitute for work, thus allocating
labour into socially unproductive activities and increasing the
financial burden on the other members of society since they
must pay for these unproductive activities.
While in most cases the distortions in labour markets have been
instituted for social policy reasons, and only rarely positively
influence the demand for labour, those explicitly introduced in
capital markets are usually connected with economic development
goals and for the most part positively influence the demand for
capital. To conclude, it would not seem to be incorrect to state
that at the bottom line capital benefits more.- 8 -
2. Proving a Point - A Digression on Distortions, Relative
Prices and Economic Development
The impact of the ubiquitous distortions in factor markets are
the daily bread of mainstream economists dealing with real world
problems. It is thus natural to assume that - to the extent that
they are perceived - their impact is quantified and welfare los-
ses from their existence or rather gains from their removal are
aptly portrayed. If it can be expected that the removal of intra-
national distortions results in lower welfare gains than those
also affecting the international allocation of resources, then
the area of international trade should prove to be rich in evi-
dence showing how fewer distortions lead to greater efficiency
and then to better economic performances. It is apparent, how-
ever, "that most of the empirical work has not provided an ade-
2
quate test of the [HOSS] model" (Krueger, 1977) .
There is, however, a pedestrian approach to the subject which
engenders at least circumstantial evidence on the interconnection
between distortions and economic performance (Agarwala, 1983). In
his analysis of price distortions Agarwala reviews the evidence
from 31 countries in the 1970"s with respect to protection (of
manufacturing), agricultural pricing, exchange rate policies,
cost of credit, cost of labor, pricing of infrastructural ser-
vices and inflation. For each of these areas the countries are
classified as having low, medium or high distortion levels. With-
out passing judgement on whether the individual countries are
correctly classified, the overview in Table I.I provides suffi-
ciently convincing results that countries with lower than average
Mainstream theoretical considerations are meant in the Heck-
scher-Ohlin-Samuelson-Stolper (HOSS) sense.
For a recent overview of theoretical considerations based on
standard assumptions and on deviations therefrom as well as of
empirical evidence plus model calculations using a Bayesian
formulated model based on HOSS assumptions see Learner (1985) .
Beyond the overview, however, in which distortions are dealt
with, no attempt is made to explain performance with the degree
of distortions in factor pricing.- 9 -
Table I.I - Economic Performance and Level of Distortions in
Labor (A), Capital (B), and Exchange Rate (C) Markets


















































































































Economic performance indicates real growth rates in the case of
GDP, industrial/agricultural output and exports; in the case of
return on industry and savings ratio they are actual ratios.
Source: Exerpted and calculated from Agarwala (1983, Tables 6, 8
and 10).- 10 -
distortions in labor, capital and foreign exchange markets reveal
better economic performances, e.g. higher GDP growth rates and
considerably higher real export growth rates. To be specific, it
can be seen that - as far as distortion levels in labor markets
are concerned - in the case of real exports the growth rate in
countries with low levels of distortions is 6.5% versus. -0.3 in
high level countries. By going into a breakdown by regions and
countries and ranking the data according to increases in real
exports, the picture developed in Table I.I is also substantiat-
ed.
While the pedestrian distortion-index approach produces a rough
overview of probable interrelations between distortions and
changes in key economic variables within a prior period, a macro-
econometric growth model - structured so as to ensure full con-
cordance with theoretical (not data fitting) considerations -
provides a powerful tool to generate bottom-line estimates for
specific past or future time periods. Such a model was tapped
to help illustrate the impact of changes in relative prices over
time . With its dynamic structure and stock/flow interactions,
it is suited for applications to open economies and questions
concerning factor markets, where the medium to long-run implica-
tions of given impulses or measures are to be examined. To il-
lustrate such an analysis, a decrease in wage pressure (e.g. as
prevailed in 1983-84 in the Federal Republic of Germany) which
leads to a shift of relative prices in favor of labor was simu-
The model itself contains four income sectors: household, government, firm
and overseas. A flow of funds framework enforces all aggregate budget re-
strictions. On the real side, the model follows recent literature in incor-
porating imported raw materials as a factor of production. Factor demand is
in turn modelled in a neo-classical manner: as a function of relative factor
prices. Inventory disequilibrium also exercises a role. Prices, wages and
exchange rates are endogenous. The latter are determined through a portfolio
balance model. Final imports and exports are determined by relative prices
including the nominal exchange rate. The balance of payments identity go-
verns the evolution of net foreign holdings. Government policy is modelled
by reaction functions. The model has been solved for its steady state growth
rates and levels and incorporates general non-Walrasian dynamics. It has
been estimated using the continuous time methodology by FIML. Simulation has
confirmed the steady state properties. The model - called MCMIA: A Small
Macro-Econometric Growth Model for the Federal Republic of Germany - is
fully described and documented in Kirkpatrick (1986).- 11 -
lated. The long-term (steady state) solution yields (inter alia)
higher employment and an increase in net exports. The latter is
heavily influenced by lower raw material and intermediate imports
which are due to strong factor substitutions. This has a balance
of payments and exchange rate effect which feeds back through the
wage, price, exchange rate and output dynamics.
In the following, after reviewing trade performance, evidence on
the relevance of labor and capital costs for export performance
will be presented separately. The analysis ends with some brief
concluding remarks.- 12 -
II. Trade Performance : An Overview
1. Introduction
As mentioned above, the purpose of this paper on labor and capi-
tal costs is to yield evidence on interconnections between in-
fluences on factor market prices (i.e. distortions) and relative
export performance (see e.g. the difference between high and low
levels of labor market distortions vis-a-vis real export growth
rates in Table I.I). The approach used to achieve this begins not
with an attempt to locate distortions in factor markets, but
rather with an investigation of the performance of individual
countries in world manufacturing trade. From such a country-by-
country comparison the "winners" and the "losers" are easily
selected . By delineating a group of successful and unsuccessful
countries out of world trade it should then be possible to deter-
mine whether the more successful one were those with less dis-
torted factor markets.
2. World Trade: Trends and Structure
The average annual rate of growth of non-energy exports to the
world for the period 1965-1983 amounted to about 12.5% . Broken
down into the time frame used in this study (i.e. 1965-73 and
1973-83) the "pre-oil-shock" period (15.2%) was considerably more
boyant than the second period (10.7%). A closer examination of
underlying trends - by country and product groups - reveals the
following:
The selection process was primarily based on relative export
performance between the years 1965 and 1983, be it of positive
or negative nature. Total value of exports, export structure,
regional location and availability of other statistics were
secondary criteria.
2
Unless otherwise noted all growth rates in this section on
world trade are per annum figures.BibJiothek des Instituts
fur Weltwirtschaft Kiel
- 13 -
- Whereas exports of industrialized countries (ICs) to the world
expanded about 25% faster than those from developing countries
(DCs) in the initial period (15.6% vs. 12.1%), the positions
were reversed in 1973-1983 (10.5% and 12.4%). These trends (see
Table II. 1) reflect not only the stronger demand of ICs for
products from DCs, even the DCs increased their demand for
their own products.
- On a rough commodity group basis the stronger increase in IC
relative to DC exports in the 1965-73 period is shown to be
attributable to raw materials trends. In other words growth
rates of manufactured exports from DCs are consistently higher
than those from ICs, be it to DCs themselves or to ICs. How-
ever, as opposed to the general trends above, the growth rate
of manufactured exports from DCs to ICs in the final ten year
period was not significantly different (15.6%) than that from
DCs to DCs (16.9%) .
- A closer look at the commodity groups yields initial evidence
on the sources of those products from DCs expanding relatively
faster. The extremely rapid rate of growth in the late sixties
and early seventies in machinery and transportation goods (SITC
7) can be accounted for almost entirely by increases in tele-
communications equipment and electric machines from only five
countries (Korea, Mexico, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore). In
the case of clothing the above four Asian countries plus the
Peoples Republic of China are the big suppliers. These two
items alone accounted for about 40% of DC exports of manufac-
tures to ICs (1973) . In the ensuing period the same set of
countries expanded by Malaysia, Turkey and Brazil had broadened
their product array to cover electric and non-electrical power
machinery, domestic appliances, office equipment, cars and
ships. Machinery and transportation products together with
clothing made up over half of manufactured exports from DCs in
1983 (see Table II. 1) and almost one third of total exports .
The information on the increases presented in this paragraph
was extended and complemented by those countries which did not
do so well in order to produce the sample set described in the
following paragraphs.- 14 -
Table II.1 - Growth and Structure of Non-energy Exports
a from Industrialized (IC) and Developing
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Includes both OPEC and Non-OPEC (NOPEC) developing countries. Deviating from the usual definition,
data from the Peoples Republic of China as well as China, Taiwan are included.
cAverage annual growth rates for the specific period (%).
Commodity structure of the exports from IC or DC to IC or NOPEC in %; column sum of commodities (i.e.
raw materials + manufactures) does not add to 100% due to missing items.
Direction of IC or DC exports of a given commodity for a given year in %; row does not add to 100%
since OPEC and Centrally Planned Economies not included.
Source: Based on UNCTAD calculations.- 15 -
The impact of these trends on the product and country structure
of exports from the DCs, as well as the corresponding IC trends,
is presented also in Table II. 1. The shift away from raw material
to manufactured goods is - particularly as concerns DC-IC trade -
quite impressive.
The analysis of country performance in world trade led to the
selection of the industrializing countries included in Table
II. 2. For purposes of comparison four industrialized countries
were included as well. To understand this table, as well as
others patterned after it in the text, the reader should be par-
ticularly aware of the following points:
- The ranking of the industrializing countries is determined by
the value of manufacturing exports in the year 1983. To portray
the crucial performance aspect the ranking in 1965 (and speci-
fically in Table II.2 also in 1973) is included in ( ) directly
following the country name.
- Manufacturing exports have been calculated using a concordance
between the standard international trade classification (SITC)
and the international standard industrial classification
(ISIC) . They have been defined to encompass all manufacturing
industries (including food processing) except petroleum refin-
ing (353) and products therefrom (354) . A listing of the indus-
tries and their numbers is included in Table All.2 in Appendix
II.
The concordance was constructed by the UN Statistical office
and has been used in the past in those cases where foreign
trade and domestic trends were to be interpreted on a common
basis. It should be noted that whenever a concordance is used -
unless there is a definite 1-to-l relationship - a certain
amount of imprecision is introduced. In this case the impreci-
sion is due to the fact that at the 3-digit SITC level some
product groups must be split into two or more industries. The
imprecision introduced thereby is accepted as a trade-off for
the possibility of being able to compare rebased foreign trade
statistics with industrial statistics in order to draw conclu-
sions about the factor intensity of foreign trade.- 16 -
- The ranking of exports by value in 1983 is distorted by some
countries including re-exports in their statistics (i.e. Hong
Kong and Singapore) and by others not including exports prod-
uced or processed in customs enclaves (i.e. Mexico). Whereas
the former would not necessarily influence the evaluation of
performance if re-exports shares remain constant, the latter
means that at least the 1983 figures underestimate the actual
value of exports .
- The method of ranking chosen reflects primarily the demands of
this analysis, it is not contended that all relevant questions
relating to exports are best represented by this approach. For
instance, those countries which rigorously applied import sub-
stitution policies aiming thereby at higher domestic content in
exports and exhibiting relatively poor performance (e.g. India)
are being compared with countries which went through no import
substitution processes (e.g. Hong Kong) but rapidly expanded
exports without regard to the origin of inputs. Nevertheless,
without placing a value judgement on either of these perform-
ances, the approach taken here aims precisely at specifying the
economic ramifications opportunity costs (e.g. in terms of
economic growth or changes in foreign exchange reserves) of
applying a given policy mix - the degree to which other factors
are deemed to be more important for the welfare of a country
is a decision to be made by a given country, presumable after
weighting all alternatives.
- All export data for the Peoples Republic of China have been
calculated via inversions, i.e. by adding up the imports of
2
partner countries . They must therefore be viewed only as an
The amount of underestimation is tempered by the simple fact
that the domestic content (i.e. value-added) in these exports
is relatively small - less than 25 per cent can be assumed to
be added in such processes.
2
While inversions do embody difficulties it could be determined
(by comparing inversions of data for countries from which cor-
rect data already existed) that the problems were not of a
nature to dismiss the information as useless. To the extent
that a reclassification of China's exports was undertaken by
the importing countries, this would more than likely occur
































































































































































































































































































































aThree digit international trade classification (SITC) export data were transformed via a concordance into 3 digit manufac-
turing industry (ISIC) data. Non-oil manufactured exports were hence defined as ISIC 311-390 excluding 353 (Petroleum) and
354 (Coal etc.) . - TPhe ranking of the industrializing countries is determined by the value of exports in 1983. The numbers
in ( ) represent the ranks in 1965 and 1973. - °Without having specific knowledge about the prices of manufactured exports,
it was decided to leave thegrowth rates in nominal terms rather than deflating with a common world price index for manufac-
tures. Deflating with a common price index would not influence relative size of rates of change.
Source: Own calculations based on data from UNCTAD.- 18 -
estimate, but nonetheless one which should adequately portray
trends in the period under consideration. Export data from 1983
for India and Malaysia are based on unofficial UN estimates at
3-digit SITC levels
1.
A brief examination of Table II.2 (i.e. of the change in ranking
of the countries) provides some interesting insights into the
relative export performance of the 21 countries. This information
is exerpted below, whereby the numbers in the ( ) represent the
change in rank in the periods 1965-1973 and 1973-1983 respecti-
vely.
Winners Mid-field Losers
Korea (+14,+3) Brazil (-2,+2) Egypt (-7,-3)
Taiwan (+10,+1) Morocco (-1,+1) India (-6,-2)
Turkey (+3,+2) Mexico (-1,+1) Argentina (-1,-4)
Thailand (+2,+2) Ivory Coast (-1,+1) Philippines (-2,-3]
Indonesia (0,+3) Hong Kong (+1,-2) Pakistan (-5,+l)
Singapore (0,+2) Kenya (-1,0) China (-2,-2)
Tunisia (+1,+1) Colombia (-1,-2)
Malaysia (-5,+2)
a - 1 over entire period 1965-1983.
It is worthwhile noting that those countries which did excep-
tionally well or exceptionally poor (i.e. the first four in each
group) exhibited an increase or a decrease in both periods. In
other words they were consistent (but not constant) in their per-
The estimates in the past have proved to be relatively reli-
able.- 19 -
formance. While Korea and Taiwan belong to the often-quoted set
of top performers, Turkey and Thailand do not, but have slowly
and continually moved up the ranks into positions in the middle
of the group. Should the growth rate differential between these
two countries and India remain the same, they will have nudged
out India in the rankings in the course of 1986.
Among the losers also appears Malaysia, a country often placed
otherwise among the winners, where relatively poor performance in
the initial period was only somewhat compensated for in the years
following 1973. The pattern revealed for Malaysia reflects quite
well the course of economic policies, as the slower growth rates
in the latter part of the 1960s induced policy-makers to shift
strategies to a less inward-looking import substituting stance.
The change in the framework of relative prices not only induced
new investments from within, the flow of foreign direct invest-
ments also increased noticeably, paritcularly into labor-inten-
sive industries manufacturing non-traditionsl products .
In addition to such background information which can be fitted
into the patterns revealed in Table II. 2, additional insights
into the performance of the individual countries can be gathered
from indicators of export diversification/concentration. Such an
index - in this case the coefficient of variation - has been
constructed for all countries in the sample set, based upon the
shares of the 28 industries into which exports have been catago-
2
rized .
In Chapter III further mention will be made of the specific
ramifications of these investments in connection with export
processing zones.
2
The coefficient of variation is the quotient of the standard
deviation and mean. For the calculations carried out here the
number of observations entering into the formula (i.e. the
denominator of the mean) is 28. Thus a country which has all
its exports concentrated into one category would reveal the
highest degree of concentration (or lowest degree of diversi-
fication) . If each of the 28 industries had the same share,
then the diversification (concentration) would be the highest
(lowest). The smaller the value of the coefficient of varia-
tion, the higher the diversification.- 20 -
While economic theory stipulates that a country profits the most
when it specializes in its comparative advantage, a complete
specialization in one area can engender severe adjustment pro-
blems if export receipts in the area of concentration suffer a
major fall. Generally speaking, however, industrial diversifi-
cation occurs as an economy develops (this can be seen in Table
II.3 knowing what relative income levels are) and in connection
with a spreading out of industries in line with the availability
of intermediary inputs, qualification levels of labor, resource
base and financial assets. Thus, adjustment problems which may
occur due to external shocks in one or more sectors can often be
absorbed by other sectors, albeit with a time lag. Whatever the
case, the crucial factor in the adjustment process is the ability
to react flexibly. This can mean, for instance, that prices in
factor markets are not permanently fixed in real terms. In the
case of countries like Mexico, Malaysia, Indonesia and Egypt,
which draw a sizeable portion of export receipts from energy re-
sources, are subjected to the danger of becoming inflexible to
the extent that they depend on one item without ensuring that
other areas of production (in line with future comparative ad-
vantages) are allowed to develop. The difficulties embodied
therein are simply that such alternative exports are often pro-
moted via policies affecting the factor markets directly rather
than the product markets. Hence the factor intensity of produc-
tion differs considerably from given comparative advantages and
the flexibility is not given because of the capital intensity.
The above mentioned trends provide the stage upon which the fol-
lowing more detailed analysis of performance in world trade in
connection with factor market policies is enacted.Table II.3 - Concentration/Diversification of Non-oil Manufactured Exports from Selected Industrializing and









































































































































































































































































Coefficient of variation was calculated for each year for every country based on shares of the 28 three
digit ISIC industries from 311-390 excluding 353 and 354 in sum of the exports. The larger (smaller) the co-
efficient, the greater the concentration (diversification) of exports. See text and corresponding footnote
for further explanations. - The ranking of the industrializing countries is determined by value of manufact-
ured exports in 1983.




Shifts in trade flows are a reflection of evolving changes in
competitive positions, which have led to a relocation of pro-
duction activities from one country to another. Two main reasons
behind such shifts can be identified. First there is a natural
shifting in the comparative advantages in line with development
level-induced changes in factor prices, whereby the faster eco-
nomies grow the greater such changes will be. This reason is not
of direct interest in the context of this analysis. Rather the
second reason is the focal point: namely the degree to which
changes can be attributed to distortions in factor markets caus-
ing thereby the price of labor to deviate from a level dictated
by labor's relative scarcity in a given economy. As was outlined
above, distortions represent any measure instituted which affects
the relative prices in factor markets and thus the structure of
production.
2. Remuneration and Policies Affecting Labor Markets
In the case of labor, the above basically means any measure which
impacts upon the price of labor or rather the remuneration an
employee receives. That is to say, in market economies the remu-
neration of labor is basically supposed to represent the pecuni-
ary counterpart of labor services offered. Although technically
this still holds true, the remuneration received directly by the
person performing the services has become an increasingly smaller
share of total remuneration directly and indirectly attributable
to the employment of an individual. Thus in discussing the impli-
cations of changes in relative prices between labor and capital
it is quite essential to use terms which cover the entire spec-
trum of costs generated. Labor costs therefore include as a main
component wages, but also non-wage costs dictated by government
regulations, agreements with unions, company policies and societ-
al traditions. The non-wage costs cover such items (e.g. social
security payments) which employees can see is being paid for them- 23 -
and from which they assume they will receive benefits at some
future point in time. Included as well are those expenditures
required to allow a person to carry out a job he or she is to be
paid for, these being basically such items as required by health
and safety regulations enacted by the State but may also be the
result of bargaining agreements with unions .
Generally speaking the majority of the influences affecting the
cost of labor have been implemented in the course of creating the
modern Welfare State. They have caused the level and the struc-
ture of real wages to inadequately reflect productivity differ-
entials between labor force cohorts and hence have made it very
2
expensive for firms to hire labor . In other cases they have de-
creased interfirm as well as interregional mobility or - in con-
nection with other social/fiscal measures enacted by the state -
have made leisure more attractive than working .
For the sake of argumentation the various measures impacting
directly upon labor markets by affecting the demand for and/or
supply of labor can be structured in accordance with the intended
thrust of the measures:
A. Policies directly influencing pay levels
1. legal minimum wages
2. contract minimum wages and lump-sum pay increases achieved
via collective bargaining
These might be as minimal as safety glasses provided by employ-
ers, but as extensive as elaborate workplace pollution contol
devices which protect against poisonous gases, loud noises and
bright lights.
2
Minimum wages, for instance, establish wage floors below which
employers cannot legally pay. Thus if the value of the output
(i.e. productivity) of some persons is lower than what is sti-
pulated by minimum wages, then these persons will not be em-
ployed.
Such could be the case if unemployment insurance levels were
close to net earnings. If incentives did not exist to ensure
that the unemployed actively sought new jobs, then paid leisure
could well result.- 24 -
B. Measures directed toward job rights
1. employment security
2. antidiscrimination
C. Actions aimed at job environment
1. work rules
2. job/occupational training
D. Legislation embodying social aspects
1. maternity leave
2. paid sick leave
3. unemployment compensation
E. Policies affecting the economic environment
1. collective bargaining framework
2. bureaucratic and legal ramifications
While the extent to which all these measures exist is far greater
in industrialized than in industrializing countries, it is far
from true that industrializing are only marginally affected. As
is evident in Box 3 (Labor Codes in Action - the Case of Panama)
industrializing countries have instituted measures which even
extend beyond what exists in some high income countries, and in
doing so have severely hampered their own development paths. In
other words, Panama, by severely regulating labor markets in
general, has created inflexibilities which restricted private
investment, decreased growth rates of GDP and led to an actual
decline in real exports (see Table III.l). Panama thus represents
a case at one end of the spectrum, where distortions have reached
into almost every aspect of the labor market, not only shifting
demand to more capital intensive methods of production, but con-
straining production itself. Granted, the evidence is only cir-
cumstantial, but in the area of offshore banking, where labor
code restrictions were not as constraining, employment did expand
rapidly as the number of foreign banks taking advantage of the
offshore facilities increased .
They now number almost 150 and their loans account for about 2
% of the offshore loans in the entire world.- 25 -
Box 3
Labor Codes in Action - the Case of Panama
Many Latin American countries have attempted to organize labor
markets in a manner intended to ensure full employment at social-
ly acceptable conditions by installing labor codes. Panama is one
of these countries, having established its present code in 1972
together with a new constitution. In the latter it is laid down
that the State is obligated to establish the political and econo-
mic policies necessary to promote full employment and to ensure
that each employed person can earn a decent existence. The Labor
Code (LC) was perceived as the basic modus operandi for the labor
market. Therewithin the relationship between capital and labor is
governed, providing "special attention of the workers by the
State, with state interventions to make remunerated employment
available to all those without work" (LC, para. 1). While until
this year the LC has remained virtually intact, labor market
problems have become increasingly severe and per capita economic
growth has dwindled from well above to below Latin American aver-
ages (see Table III.l). Is there a connection between the de-
crease in the demand for labor (or in aggregate demand) and the
enaction of the Labor Code (i.e. the increase in labor market
distortions)? An examination of the evidence yields an answer.
Panama, literally straddling major shipping routes and located
just below the rich US market would seem to be a country blessed
with locational advantages which could be matched by but few
other nations. If on top of these the country
- revealed political stability in a region often known for in-
stability,
- had levels of infrastructure still being aimed at by other
countries and
- exhibited educational levels considerably above countries at
similar stage of development,
then it would seem to be predestined to be an economic success.
As can be seen in Table III.l, growth rates for Panama ever since
1970 have been (considerably) below those of other Latin American
countries, whereas the opposite was true in the prior decade.
Keeping this in mind and without being aware of any other major
explanation, attention is turned to developments which could help
explain why Panama did not turn its locational advantages into
higher growth rates.
- In a survey of employers about factors influencing their de-
mand for labor, hiring/firing and wage inflexibilities due to
the Labor Code were stated as 1 implying additional costs
amounting to 30% more per employee . Independent of these re-
See Spinanger (1984).Table III. 1-Development Indicators
a for Panama and Selected Latin American Countries: 1960-1982°
Latin America Panama Costa Rica Colombia Mexico Brazil






















































































































































Annual growth rates in real terms.,- The underlined figures are above Latin American averages. - Data is
only for period 65-70 and 70-80. - Effective change in real exchange rate - see Appendix I for explanation.
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank data and national statistics.- ?7 - 27
suits an econometric analysis run on macro-data, arrived at
results which were extremely similar .
- Employees themselves estimated that if they were permitted
to receive monetary rewards for higher productivity 10% more
productivity would be forthcoming .
- To the extent that private investments have been effected by
firms already operating in Panama, every effort is made to
take advantage of the capital incentives.
- Established foreign direct investments have been reduced or
withdrawn because of the ramifications of the Code. Many po-
tential foreign investors have declined to invest in Panama
either because they were already awajre of the impact of the
Labor Code or soon become aware of it .
Out of all these measures listed above impacting upon labor mar-
kets, at the crux of the problem in Panama is the employment
security issue (classical as Bw in the listing of means impacting
on labor markets), or rather the "stability clause" which be-
stows job security upon employees after being with a company more
than 2 years. Since the employer's only possibility of releasing
an employee is through paying the prescribed severence pay (which
increases with years of service) plus a fine of 50% for unjusti-
fied firing, the stability clause effectively increases the rela-
tive price of labor. Given the increase of severence pay with
each additional year of service, firms are faced with an ever
increasing potential financial demand which - particularly for
small, labor-intensive firms - can soon exceed capital assets.
The second most important issue (from the demand for labor side)
concerned the broad aspect of unions, which encompassed not only
collective bargaining issues but also special rights granted to
union members allowing them to be given leave for the purpose of
assuming an official union position and then return to the com-
pany after 5 years to be reemployed with seniority as if no leave
had occurred. The incentive for companies to substitute capital
for labor is quite obvious.
While the socially oriented regulations (i.e. Dl and D2) were not
considered by employers in general to have a significant affect,
it could be determined that in those companies where a high share
of women were employed, the moral hazard difficulties with mater-
nity leave were considerably higher. In some cases this led to a
substitution of women in non-child bearing age for those where
the risk of pregnancy was still high. Here again capital was also
substituted for labor.
See Butelman and Videla (1985).
2
See Spinanger (1986) .
In a survey of foreign investors who had actually begun con-
crete steps towards investing in Panama, but then decided other-
wise, almost 40% (50% more than the next item) said that the LC













Development of Total Labor Costs in Panama since
1960 - Compared with German since 1966








A=Base pay + social
security
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
Source: Own calculations based on data from various
national sources.- 29 -
What all these benefits required by the LC, bargained for by
unions or even offered by employers, induced in the way of non-
wage labor costs can be seen in Diagram III.l. The initial costs
of the LC actually almost caused their percent of base wages to
equal the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany. If the
diagram had included a risk premium due to the stability clause
if would actually have surpassed the German line at that point
and caused the gap to be smaller later on. While Germany might be
able to afford such increases (i.e. having an advantage in physi-
cal capital intensive and human capital intensive industries),
Panama, where more labor intensive industries are called for, can
surely not.
After several unsuccessful forages, the government finally (in
March 1986) adopted changes in the LC which - inter alia - allow
for productivity-oriented payments and exempt small-scale indus-
tries from the Code entirely. The stability clause, however,
still remains on the books and will thus remain the barrier which
keeps jobs from being created, keeps new investments from being
realized and prevents Panama from producing a broader spectrum
of competitively priced products. Conjecturing about how,Panama
might develop without the above distortions leads to the follow-
ing concluding question: Why fast growing Asian exporters, par-
ticularly given Panama's undeniable locational advantages and
knowing that some of these countries a mere 25 years ago where
referred to as basket-cases (e.g. South Korea) or rather known
for labor unrest (e.g. Singapore)?
Companies in the Far East upon being approached by official
investment missions often told the mission that as long as the
labor code contained (inter alia) the stability clause, they
had no interest in investing in Panama.- 30 -
In drawing final conclusions about the impact of labor costs on
the structure of production, its location and trade flows two
additional pieces of information are necessary. First of all the
development of labor costs must be viewed in connection with the
development of capital costs, that is in connection with the
appropriate substitute factor of production. Hence, when discuss-
ing events in an inflationary world it is incorrect - at least in
the context of this analysis from the production side - to dis-
cuss real wages deflated with consumer prices. The relevant price
index is the one which applies to the cost of capital. This would
be the price of capital goods as well as the (real) interest
rate. Minimum wages, wages and the price of capital are all shown
in Table III.2 Aside from pointing out that minimum wage legis-
lation is concentrated in the less successful countries, the
relationship between minimum wages/wage rates on the one hand and
the price of capital on the other hand illustrate policies prac-
tised in various countries. In interpreting the results, however,
it is essential that information about other policies crucial to
tapping comparative advantages is taken into consideration (e.g.
see comments on page 12 concerning interfacing between domestic
and international markets) . Likewise information on productivity
levels is also necessary to fit the trends into a picture which
reflects real developments. This might be, for instance, that
higher rates of growth of wages in Taiwan reflect productivity
increases to a larger degree than in Egypt.
Secondly since the costs of production represent only a part of
the costs going into the final sales price of a product, the
entire spectrum of these costs determined to what extent produc-
tion activities are shifted to different locations. The extent to
which intercountry transfers take place means that additional
factors (e.g. exchange rates, political and economic environment)
enter into the decision vector. Of these aspects only the ex-
change rate or rather foreign exchange/capital markets will be
The table is based on incomplete information for wages, which
should actually be wage costs. Nonetheless it does give an
overview of relative trends which would probably not be too






































































































































































































































































































































aThis table is an attempt to combine data from various sources into one coherent table. Since definitional
problems exist between countries as concerns minimum wages and wage rates, caution is necessary. - See foot-
note in Table II.2 for explanation of ranking. -
 cThe base in 1966 is in national currency units,corrected for
any possible reforms. The letter following the base refers to hour (H) , day (D) or month (M). - wage rates
generally apply to manufacturing. See also footnote c. The W after base for Egypt means week. UK is in pence.
- ^ata taken from World Bank (1984) tables.
Source: Own calculations based on Starr (1981), World Bank (1984) and various national sources..- 32 -
taken into consideration. In other words the interface between
the domestic economy and the outside world (i.e. other economies)
is considered crucial not only as concerns relocation of indus-
tries but also as applies to the interfacing of domestic produc-
tion with foreign markets. With respect to an exchange rate index
(i.e. effective exchange rate changes), these calculations illus-
trate one particular influence, namely that emanating from ex-
change rate changes, on international competitiveness. It is thus
an essential link in interpreting developments in domestic mar-
kets and comparing them with those in international markets. That
is, an exchange rate which - in real terms - is allowed to appre-
ciate by not adjusting for domestic price increases relative to
other countries, will make exportables less and less competitive
even if domestic factor markets have allowed relative scarcities
to be refelcted in relative prices. Hence performance in world
trade will - ceteris paribus - be negatively influenced.
This can be best exemplified by drawing on evidence from the
table with the real effective exchange rate changes (Table AI.2,
export price based index) combined with export performance indi-
cators (Table II. 2). As noted above changes in real exchange
rates are but one factor affecting the ability to compete in
world markets and thus must be viewed as a cog in the set of
gears powering a country's development. The following caveats
should be observed:
- Changes in real exchange rates only indicate a shift in the
competitive position of a country in world markets and do not
imply anything about the actual reaction of the country. Hence
a real devaluation, which improves the competitive position,
does not mean that competitive exports will be automatically
forthcoming. In other words producers must react.
- Given the fact that producers must react to a change in their
competitive position, it takes time before the necessary deci-
sions are made and investments effected in order to engender- 33 -
the products to be exported. To the extent that production
facilities and marketing channels already exist such lead-time
can be quite short. If new investments need be effected, mar-
keting channels established and other steps taken, then the
time frame can encompass several years.
- In the same vein real exchange rate changes will be all the
more effective in enducing shifts in production if the changes
are perceived as being of long enough duration so as to reduce
the risk of not receiving a fair return. In other words widely
fluctuating real exchange rates dampen the ability to predict
the present value of a future stream of earnings .
- Finally, changes in real exchange rates merely indicate size
and direction of shifts in the competitive position, they do
not imply that a country's exchange rate is at a level which
permits exporting competitive products. This means that the
changes have to enter or be within a range which would allow
efficiently produced exports to be competitively priced.
Tying this information to the real effective exchange rate
changes is most easily managed if the breakdown of export per-
formance in the two periods (Chapter II, Table 2 and listing of
winners/losers) is restructured to include real exchange rate
changes (see Table III. 3). At first glance there would seem to
be a poor concordance between export performance and real ex-
change rate changes. But drawing on the above remarks allows the
following evidence to be presented:
- The four top export performers, knowing that they had insti-
tuted policies (to a greater or lesser degree) to facilitate
exports in line with comparative advantages, received from the
real devaluations additional impulses for their exports. In the
Recent trends in oil prices protray quite well what happens if
expected price increases, upon which investment decisions are
based, are not realized.- 34 -
Table III.3 - Changes in Export Performance Rankings (a) and Real Effec-
tive Exchange Rate Changes (b) - A Comparison
Winners Midfield Losers
























































































































a) Change in rankings from Table II. 2; i.e. an export performance indicator
b) Change in real effective exchange rate from Table AI.2.
c) Rank change + 1 over period 1965-1983.
Source: See Table II.2 and AI.2.- 35 -
case of Taiwan and South Korea the real exchange rates were
relatively constantly devalued throughout the periods and the
fluctuations were quite small.
- The top four losers exhibit little correlation between perform-
ance and real exchange rate changes. Given the wide spectrum of
interventions impacting factor (and product) markets in these
countries, the not overly large exchange rate changes could
probably not be expected to compensate adequately. Only in the
case of Argentina, does it seem logical to assume that such a
large change in real exchange rates should have some effects.
However, in this case the lead time must be taken into consi-
deration as the real change took place only in 1980. Thus
should entrepreneurs be able to reckon with a continuation of
such a shift, additional exports would no doubt be induced. It
might be noted that characteristics of the first three losers
are wide fluctuations in real exchange rates, thereby increas-
ing the difficulties entrepreneurs faced.
- For Colombia and Indonesia the large changes in real exchange
rates do not seem to reflect at all the changes in the export
rankings. In the case of Indonesia there is the impact of the
oil price increases on the real exchange rate. Since the impact
is less pronounced in consumer price based index (see Table
AI.2) this figure for 1983 is probably more representative of
changes is the competitive position. Columbia's real exchange
rate is kept at a high level by receipts from the drug trade.
That their losses remained relatively small is due to various
policies enacted by the government to promote exports, thereby
compensating partly for the shift.
The conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is simply that real
exchange rate changes must be viewed in connection with other
relevant trade measures in order to know where and why they in-
fluenced trade performance. This is particularly important to
realize knowing that industrialization measures can compensate
(via subsidies) for disadvantages suffered from overvaluated
currencies. Over a longer period of time, however, such domestic- 36 -
countermeasures run into financial constraints so that eventually
a poorer export performance will result.
A brief but important discussion of the issues involved here and
the methods used to construct an index representing a comprehen-
sive picture of changes in the international competitive position
is presented in Appendix I. In this connection the various policy
measures which distort monetary flows or manipulate exchange
rates also need to be taken into consideration (see Table AI.l
for overview) . As a matter of fact if the number of different
types of regulations/restrictions for the same set of countries
used in Table I.I are added up for the 70's the relationship
between lack of restrictions and higher export growth is even
better than the indicator used by Agarwala. This impression is
actually visually created to some degree in Table AI.1. It might
be added that to complete the picture information should be in-
cluded on the trade barriers which restrict imports as well as
cause indirect imports to increase the prices of domestic inputs.
3. Patterns of Trade and Factor Intensities - Deducing about
Relative Labor Costs
It is standard procedure in international economics to examine
the factor intensity of foreign trade of a given country to
determine whether that country is specializing in products from
industries which are considered to be in line with posited com-
parative advantages of the country. To the extent that this is
not the case policies can then be examined to determine how they
influenced relative factor prices. Since changes in the rankings
of the countries in the tables used is interpreted as reflecting
the performance in foreign trade, the relevance for this analysis
is immediately apparent.
Such factor intensities were calculated here and an overview of
the factor intensities is given in Tables All.3 (for exports of
The method used for calculating factor intensities and back-
ground information on its relevance is presented in Appendix
II.- 37 -
each country to the world) and All.4 (for exports of each country
to industrialized countries). It can be seen there that - gener-
ally speaking - among the industrializing countries, those with a
decrease in the capital intensity or with a lower capital inten-
sity of exports over time were those whose export performance was
higher.
Despite the usefulness of this indicator of efficient (or ineffi-
cient) industrialization policies, it was decided to use a
slightly more differentiated approach in this analysis. That is,
since the major thrust of such exercises is to determine whether
exports are in line with posited factor intensities, it was felt
that an examination of exports along more unequivocal lines would
be a straight-forward approach. Thus the exports (by industries)
were divided into categories which could labled as being "defini-
tely" low capital intensive and "definitely" high capital inten-
sive. This meant that those industries around the middle of the
physical capital intensity field (see Table AII.l for factor
intensities) - where there might be some questions to begin with
- were excluded. The shift in the shares over time (i.e. in the
periods 65-73 and 73-83) were then compared. One can immediately
determine in which clearly delineated areas exports are flowing
through. The same approach was carried out for human capital
intensities. The results can be seen in Table III.4 (which con-
tains a breakdown of exports by physical capital intensity) and
Table III. 5 (which contains a breakdown of exports by human capi-
tal intensity).
In the case of Brazil, for instance, which showed up on the phy-
sical capital intensity calculation as remaining relatively con-
stant between 1965 and 1973, it can be seen that the share of
exports in "definitely" low capital intensive areas increased
quited strongly in the initial period. In the second period,
however, they stagnated while the "definitely" high capital in-
tensive exports strongly expanded. Generally speaking the tables
allow a clearer picture to be developed than with the pure capi-Table III.4 - Shifts
a in Export Shares into Industries with Definitely Low
c or Definitely High Physical Capital
Intensities for Exports to World and to Industrialized Countries
Countries





































































































































































































































































aSimple difference in shares between stated time periods. - Export shares based on 28 ISIC industries between 311-
390 (excluding 353 and 354). -
 CConsists of following ISIC industries: 321,322,323,324,331,332,342,380,381,382,383,
385 and 390. - Consists of following ISIC industries: 313,314,341,351,352,361,362,369,371 and 372. -
 eCapital.in-
tensities defined as capital assets/employee; see also Appendix II. 1980 capital intensity indices used. - The
ranking of the industrializing countries is determined by value manufactured exports in 1983. The number in () is
ranking in 1965.
Source: Own calculations based on data from UNCTAD.Table III. 5 - shifts
a in Export Shares into Industries with Definitely Low
c or Definitely High Human Capital (HC)
Intensities












































































































































































































































































aSimple difference in shares between stated time periods. - Export shares based on 28 ISIC industries between,311-
390 (excluding 353 and 354). -
 cConsists of following ISIC industries: 321,322,323,324,331,332,356 and 390. - Con-
.^r ^ _r ^ _ — J — — -— ,_ — — -- .__ _. _ _.._ _ j , _ _ T _ j _ y _^ * _|—* f J —~ —~ ^ — — g —' ^^ ^ 1 1 "—' — ^ V "^^ ^^ ™ »
sists of following ISIC industries: 313,314,341,351,352,371,372,382 and 384. - TJuman. capital intensities defined
as wages/employee; see also Appendix II. 1980 human capital intensity indices used. - The ranking of the industri-
alizing countries is determined by value of manufactured exports in 1983. The number in () is ranking in 1965.
source: uwn calculations oasea on data rrom UNLTAU.- 40 -
tal intensity measure, not only of the expansion by factor inten-
sity grouping, but also by time period. Thus the top four coun-
tries rapidly increased their exports in the low capital inten-
sity areas in the initial period, while high capital intensity
products revealed a relative decrease. In the ensuing 73/83 per-
iod we find high physical and human capital-intensive goods gain-
ing - a development to be expected as income levels increase or
rather as relative prices of factor inputs change (as described
above).
Those countries located at the bottom or those whose rank dropped
sharply over time (also those with the lowest growth rate of
GDP/capita) revealed tendencies to increase exports of relatively
physical and human capital intensive goods. Vis-3-vis the indus-
trialized countries this becomes even more apparent.
4. The Effectiveness of Reducing Production Costs through Free
Economic Activity Zones - Some Evidence
In the course of reorienting development policies towards world
market parameters, so as to allow relative domestic factor market
prices to more closely reflect relative factor scarcities and
hence lead to a more competitive economy, the extent and speed
with which old price structures are replaced by new ones is often
determined by.political considerations rather than economic effi-
ciency criteria. To compliment such policies and at the same time
to benefit - inter alia - from an immediate removal of major
distortions, an ever increasing number of countries (see Table
III. 6) have opted for free economic activity zones (FEAZs), which
are supposed to represent relatively undistorted enclaves in an
otherwise distorted environment . Particularly in light of the
In Appendix Table AIII.l an overview of the types of free zones
is presented. The ranking in the overview is roughly determined
by the expected value-added impact of a zone to an average
economy. To the extent that the structure of a given economy
differs considerably from that of an average economy, the rank-
ing and the explanations have to be adjusted accordingly.- 41 -
success which some Asian NICs seemed to have had in tapping the
FEAZ potential, these zones have been rapidly created in numerous
industrialized as well as industrializing countries. As much as
the opening up of the economy via specific locations and/or
activities is considered by some to be a politically sensible
move, others perceive of FEAZs being a potential barrier to fur-
2
ther factor and product market liberalization actions . Assuming
the former to be the case, then FEAZs are seen as representing
but one step in the removal of distortions throughout the econo-
my.
In light of the growing importance of FEAZs in both DCs as well
as ICs their global impact with respect to the structure, devel-
opment and implications of production, employment and investment
in as well as trade to/from these zones, must be more clearly
understood . As concerns their importance, Table III.6 documents
their increased use in the Asian countries, accounting for
slightly less than half the zones existing in developing coun-
tries today. Excluding the free-zone cities of Hong Kong and
Macau plus the free-zone-like city-state of Singapore - direct
manufacturing employment in these zones alone amounts to well
over 500,000. Although but minor with respect to total employment
in and exports of the manufacturing sector, countries like Malay-
It is felt that FEAZs will be a success in attracting firms and
- to the extent that the firms are successful themselves -
domestic entrepreneurs will want to imitate them. In doing so
resistance against opening up the economy will be reduced.
2
The fear is based on the assumption that FEAZs will only serve
as an alibi thus stopping further progress on an economy-wide
scale.
For an overview of all EPZs see Currie (1985) , for those in
Asia together with an investigation of their performance see
articles in Lee (1984). A comparative analysis of the perform-
ance of EPZs in Asia is presented in Spinanger (1984).- 42 -
Table III.6 - Spread of Free Zones in South, Southeast and East
Asia by Year of Establishment














































Exact status not known.- 43 -
sia, Taiwan, Mauritius and Sri Lanka all still can, or could,
attribute sizeable portions of their nontraditional manufactured
exports to the establishment and expansion of their EPZ facili-
ties. In the case of Taiwan, the zones developed strong linkages
with the domestic economy and contributed noticeably in creating
spin-off industries and developing technology. It can thus per-
haps be contended, that to the extent that EPZs did not develop
stronger linkages over time, inefficient policies existed or the
domestic economy was not yet able to produce the necessary inter-
mediate inputs .
Despite the rapid expansion in the number and importance of EPZs
they are often not considered as an efficient industrialization
policy measure. In particular there seems to be the tendency in
some countries to view the EPZs as an "alibi" trade liberaliza-
tion policy. Thus, together with an expansion of non-traditional
exports from firms in EPZs, import substitution policies for the
domestic sector are perpetuated or even expanded instead of being
phased out . To the extent that this is accompanied by subsidies
for firms in EPZs (in the form of lower-than-market prices for
industrial land, utilities and other services as well as subsi-
dized loans) then any positive benefits attributable to the EPZs
can easily be negated.
Belongs of course to Africa, but mentioned here since it has
adopted a flexible approach to the free zone idea.
2
Given also the experience of foreign companies in Singapore,
where they developed stronger ties to local entrepreneurs over
the years, there would seem to be little reason to doubt the
ability of EPZs to do so. Obviously, however, this is not going
to be a rapid process in countries which have a weaker indus-
trial base (e.g. Bangladesh).
This might well be observed in Malaysia where large scale,
heavy industry projects have been inititated in recent years
despite numerous warnings about their allocative inefficiency.
The Philippines could also fit into such a category, at least
as concerns the perpuation of protection for domestic indus-
tries. Likewise policies in Panama seem to be influenced by
such an attitude. As concerns the People's Republic of China
with its special economic zones it remains to be seen whether
it is also following a course where the domestic market will
continue to remain subjected to different industrialization
policy measures than prevail in the zones.- 44 -
That economic gains are forthcoming, that is, that industries
settle in zones in accordance with efficiency criteria, can be
shown in two, not entirely independent examples. First of all the
case of Malaysia, where free zones were legislated at the beginn-
ing of the seventies. Without embarking on a cost benefit analy-
sis of the 11 zones existing, today in Malaysia, it can be easily
documented that the zones have been successful in
- attracting firms in line with shifting comparative advantages
and
- at the same time allowing firms in the zones to structure their
activities in an efficient hence competitive manner.
Secondly an examination of the electronics industry imports from
non-OECD countries into OECD countries (a particularly relevant
product because it is labor intensive work being incorporated
into products of higher income elasticity demand) reveals that
(see Table III.7) with the exception of India EPZs induced no-
ticeable increases in the shares. Behind this development the
following occurred:
- shifts in shares basically coincided with shifts in relative
labor costs - particularly if new incentives for firms setting
up in the EPZs (e.g. Malaysia) are taken into account,
- that factor intensities of the electronics firms in the zones
were roughly at levels in line with labor intensive production
structures (see Spinanger, 1986, chapter 4).
What all this means in terms of trade flows between ICs and DCs
and among DCs can be seen in Diagram III.l, where the produc-
tion/sales paths of a Japanese company are outlined. With the
necessary information on labor and capital costs the flows could
no doubt be explained without difficulty.
See Spinanger (1984) and Warr (1985) for such analyses.Table III.7 - EPZs
a and Imports of Electronics Industry Products
Developing Countries, 1965-1983











(2) as % of (1)



























































































































































electronics industry is considered to be made up of the following 9 SITC groups (Rev. 1):
714.2 calculating and accounting machines, including electronic computers
714.3 statistical machines, including electronic machines
714.9(2) parts of office machinery
724.1 television broadcast receivers
724.2 radio broadcast receivers
724.9 telecommunications equipment, n.e.s.
729.3 thermionic, etc. valves and tubes, transistors, semiconductors, etc.
729.9(5) electrical condensers and parts
891.1 phonographs, tape and other sound recorders, etc.
c d
Billions of US$. - Ranking of sources by average values in years 1965 and 1966.
Source: Own calculations based on UNCTAD data.- 46 -
Diagram III.2





































Explanation: IC =integrated circuits; Cond.= condenser; EPZ =
Expert Processing Zone; FZT=Free Trade Zone; Raw
materials include intermediate inputs.
Source: Adapted from Kenji (p. 203).- 47 -
Since FEAZs are used extensively in connection with the offshore
processing arrangements of industrialized countries, an attempt
to explain source countries' shares in US overseas processing
imports in terms of labor costs and productivity differentials
has yielded results that at best can be called mixed (see Tables
III. 8 and III.9). If at all, it would seem applicable to trade in
simple, mass-produced electrical components, for which low cost
producers in Southeast Asia to some extent have been able to
increase their market shares in accordance with their comparative
advantage (see Bothe (1985) for more detailed information). For
instance in the case of electrical components for the US market,
Southeast Asia and Mexico deliver over 75% of the imports. A
comparison of the wage and productivity differentials does seem
to show that Malaysia has a strong competitive position, thereby
helping to explain its performance above.
5. Conclusions
In this brief attempt to outline, analyze and interpret - albeit
in an eclectic manner - the interconnection between distortions
in labor markets and international trade performance, the evid-
ence presented at least provides a degree of credence to the
posited thrust of the impact. It was first shown in the case of
Panama - as an example on one end of the spectrum - what can
happen when labor markets are so rigidly regulated that not only
the demand for labor is negatively influenced, but also exports
and economic growth in general are severely influenced. Attention
was then drawn to the overall factor market impact of industria-
lization policies by examining the prices for labor and capital
and then prying into the degree to which countries concentrated
their exports in industries where they were assumed to have com-
parative advantages. This revealed that countries which did fol-
low more efficient policies as concerns the allocation of resour-
ces (i.e. labor and capital) were those which were most success-
ful.Table III.8 - Wages in Major Industries of Selected Countries Relative to United States (1980)
Commodity Groups Japan Mexi- Germa- Cana- Malay- Singa- Phil- Tai- Hong
ko ny da sia pore lippines wan Kong
Metals
Wearing apparel & other
textile products
Heavy machinery, non-electric
Office machines & parts
Electric household appli-
ances, incl. phonographic &
sount-amplifying equipment
Equipment for emitting &
receiving TV & radio signals
Electric & electronic compo-
nents, incl. semiconductors




^Differential measured as average annual wage in source-country over the equivalent in US. -
1979. -
 CISIC 382 instead of 3825 used . - ISIC 384 instead of 3843 used. -
 eFor total manu-
facturing sector, 1978.













































































































Wearing apparel & other
textile products
Heavy machinery, non-electric
Office machines & parts
Electric household appli-
ances, incl. phonographic &
sount-amplifying equipment
Equipment for emitting &
receiving TV & radio signals
Electric & electronic compo-
nents, incl. semiconductors




















































































































.Differential measured as average annual wage in source-country over the equivalent in US. -
1979. -
 CISIC 382 instead of 3825 used . - ISIC 384 instead of 3843 used. -
 eFor total manu-
facturing sector, 1978.
Source: United Nations (1983) , International Labor Organization (1983) .- 50 -
Given this information, one possible type of strategy was exa-
mined, where relatively undistorted areas are delineated from an
otherwise distorted economy (i.e. free zones) as a first step
towards liberalizing the entire economy. It was determined that
these zones were successful in attracting large amounts of in-
vestments in basically labor-intensive industries (e.g. electro-
nics) and engendering employment as well as in noticeably in-
creasing exports to industrialized countries. While caveats were
raised with respect to the degree to which such zones were sub-
sidized and to the extent they were possibly used as an alibi not
to liberalize economies any further, those cases where free zones
proved to be successful in having production structured in line
with assumed comparative advantages and/or in developing linkages
with the domestic economy were interpreted as meaning that the
approach is generally viable. Particular reference was made to
the importance of offshore processing by inustrialized countries
in connection with these zones but also as concerns the impact of
relative labor costs on the competitive position of a country.
What remains to be clarified is whether large developing coun-
tries with rather distorted economies can institute a relatively
efficient incentive/price system so as to
- allow factors of production to be combined in a manner in line
with their relative abundance and
- ensure that access to the necessary technology, foreign inter-
mediary inputs, to foreign exchange and to financing facilities
is given.
All this is intended to produce exports which can successfully
compete in world markets. If such a system can be instituted in a
country which has otherwise performed extremely poorly in foreign
markets, then the foundation upon which the above evidence rests
would be strengthened.
Such a case in point does exist as can be seen in Box 4 which
describes the success Bangladesh has had in efficiently producing- 51 -
Box 4
Getting Richer with Rags or
Why the Emperor's New Clothes Could Be Made in Bangladesh
There are but few other countries whose per capita income lies
below Bangladesh's and even fewer who have received more develop-
ment assistance over the years. With average per capita income
growth rates just slightly above zero and with real exports ex-
panding not noticeably faster, the difference between growth,
stagnation and contraction is measured to the right of the deci-
mal point. In particular the heavy dependency on jute and jute
products (see Table III.10), the~world demand for which decreased
noticeably in the 1965-83 period , meant that economic structures
had to be shifted to more profitable areas, if the country was to
profit from foreign impulses. Recalling the terminology (from
Asian Drama) characterizing inflexibility as a trait of underde-
velopment, and knowing that binding financial constraints as well
as heavily restricted capital/foreign exchange markets leave
almost no room for manoeuvring, a dramatic export increase could
not be expected.































































The title is adapted from a book by Morawetz (Why the Emperor's
New Clothes are Not Made in Colombia (1981)) in which he exa-
mined the reasons for the quick rise and fall of the garments
industry in the 1970's.
2
World exports of raw jute (SITC 264) decreased by about 25% in
this period.- 52 -
Nonetheless and despite trends in the past there was such a
strong surge in garments exports in the last three years that
they accounted for 12.5% of total exports in 1984/85 (against
slightly over 1% in 1981/82). Although the actual dollar amount
in 1984/85 was about 110 million, Bangladesh was slapped with MFA
quotas by Great Britain, France, the United States and Canada in
the course of 1985 . While it is true that the success of garment
exports to the United States was very impressive as can be seen
in the sizeable increase in shares in Table III. 11 (particularly
relative to the development of the other suppliers), the swift-
ness of the action by the US and especially the small size of the
quotas (e.g. the quota size for men's shirts was just 50% larger
than the quotas applied by Great Britain and France alone) did
not seem justified given the actual level on exports from Bangla-
desh. Given the method of quota calculation it meant that several
hundred thousand dozens of garments would be stuck in the pipe-
line. The sharp reduction in the shares of clothing coming from
Bangladesh into the US - in the case of category 334 almost to
zero (Table III.11) - demonstrates how hard the quotas bit.
The basis for this surprising development path is three-fold.
First of all in the second half of the 70's South Korean busi-
nessmen ventured to Bangladesh to assist in transferring the
necessary technology to be able to produce and export MFA prod-
ucts. The number of domestic companies profitting from this ad-
vice remained small, but within the garment exporting community
there developed a definite awareness of the issues at stake. This
already brings the discussion to the second point namely the
endogenous desire to obtai_n knowledge and then determine how it
can be put to its best use .
The final point embodies the switch in incentive policies during
the start of the 80's, when bonded warehouses and drawback
schemes were instituted. In particular the bonded warehouses were
used extensively in this connection as they minimized bureaucra-
tic difficulties and hence costs.
It thus did not take very long before this mixture catalyzed and
garment firms were founded, whereby the South Korean links proved
to be very effective. Not only did they continue to provide the
technical assistance, knowhow and management methods, they pro-
vided the necessary textile inputs and purchased the finished
garments as well. By doing so the Bangladesh firms were even
relieved of the difficult marketing problems. Given such a smooth
functioning interface between domestic production and foreign
sales, entrepreneurs came to the fore and by the summer of 1985
almost 750 firms had been sanctioned, 465 of them were in produc-
The reason for the quotas was not because of the actual amount,
but rather because of the high growth rate (i.e. a surge).
2
The development of informative trade journals in Bangladesh is
one indication of this.- 53 -



























































































































































U.S. tariff categories relevant for trade studies; as concerns the
abbreviations. - MB = men and boys. - WGI = women, girls and in-
fants.
Source: Own calculations based on U.S. Department of Commerce
(1985, 1986) .- 54 -
tion employing about 140,000 persons . With an estimated US$ 70
million invested, a garment industry had been created in a coun-
try many believed would only be able to survive with increasingly
larger aid transfers.
That the entire process worked so well is attributable to the
above-mentioned factors plus the simple fact that an ample (re-
latively price inelastic) supply of labor existed, which could be
easily tapped and quickly trained. Thus not only were employer's
search costs close to zero there was also no need to fear that
wage pressures would become a problem (at least not in the short-
run) . Likewise the lack of minimum wages above productivity le-
vels meant that the factor intensity of production could be
aligned with relative factor scarcities. Finally productivity
levels turned out to be surprisingly high, whereby absenteeism
proved to be a non-problem and incentive payments (to the extent
they were offered) were readily accepted. All in all the entire
operation - after only a brief gestation period - now competiti-
vely produces garments for world markets or emperors should they
desire.
Bangladesh's (state run/regulated) textile industry, however,
remains totally incompetitive as landed prices of Oforeign tex-
tiles are below those of locally produced companies". But seeing
how fast production structures can change there is reason to
assume that it can be done again if the consequences are drawn
from the above scenario. The immediate incentives are alreadv
there for sure - the textiles could serve as inputs into the
rapidly expanding garment industry.
Beyond this trade journals developed and a directory of tex-
tile/garment producers has already gone into its 3rd edition.
2
Should quality differences be taken into consideration, the
difference would be larger.- 55 -
clothing and exporting then to (mainly) industrialized countries.
To contend that such success was only possible because of the
existence of the MFA and thus the necessity of certain industri-
alizing countries to export textiles in order to keep the utili-
zation rate in their own textile mills up to acceptable levels
(e.g. Korea), is incorrect. More than likely a country like Ko-
rea, which has been allocated certain quotas within the MFA
agreements, has tried to hold on to these quotas as long as pos-
sible, not knowing what happens when they move into other areas
of clothing or textile production. Therefore they continue to
produce in the assigned quota areas and attempt to profit from
whatever rents they might be able to extract from their position.
However, had MFA not existed and access to industrialized markets
was not otherwise restricted, Korea would have had to shift those
areas of production, where they no longer had comparative advant-
ages, out of the country at a far earlier point in time, if they
wanted to remain competitive in world markets. Thus the MFA can
be assumed to have actually delayed the setting up of production
in Bangladesh, rather than promoting it.
It should nenetheless be stressed that the fact that Bangladesh
was successful in this export area is attributable mainly to the
adaptability, flexibility and general entrepreneurial traits
exhibited together with essential policy measures and the exist-
ence of labor which could be efficiently tapped. Since the role
of Korea (or any other more advanced industrializing country) in
this process can best be described as one of a catalyst, the
experience of Bangladesh is relevant for other industrializing
countries where a more rapid expansion of exports would help
increase growth and thereby reduce financial constraints which
have become more severe in recent years.- 56 -
IV. Capital Costs
1. Introduction
As in the case of labor costs, the impact of factor market dis-
tortions on the demand for and supply of capital as well as the
implications for export performance, can only be approached in an
eclectic manner. While it is true that information on a wide
spectrum of aspects - from interest rates and incentives through
depreciation allowances and tax rates - is readily available,
these measures are at best very rough indicators and little in-
formation exists on their actual relevance or the extent to which
they are applied. If this describes the general state of affairs,
the situation becomes increasingly difficult when attempting to
differentiate between industrialized and industrializing coun-
tries and even more so when sectoral or subsectoral disaggrega-
tions are attempted.
In making an attempt to estimate the cost of capital, a per unit
output formulation is in line with the analysis carried out here.
The per unit costs of capital are determined by the unit price of
capital and the degree of utilization of capital in the produc-
tion process. Since - as mentioned above - the unit price of
capital itself is influenced by a variety of factors (i.e. by
exchange rates, tariff rates, financial and fiscal subsidies as
well as by depreciation allowances) and these vary widely over
The cost to a plant of holding capital stock for a period cannot be obtained
directly, but must be imputed from indirect sources, assuming that plants
aim at maximizing the present value of their net revenue after taxes. The
cost of owning one unit of productive capital stock for a year (where the
unit is defined as a dollar's worth of imported capital) has two components:
The cost of purchasing the capital equipment, and the opportunity cost of
owning it. The implicit cost to a firm i of owning on a dollar's worth of
imported capital for one year (P.) is given by:
P. = Z (1 + T.)(1-g.)(r. + d.)
 x
where:
Z = exchange rate applicable to imports of capital goods
T. = tariff rate on capital goods imported by firm i
g^ = subsidy to capital through differential income tax provisions to firm
i (corporate income tax)
r. = annual real interest rate, including subsidies, facing firm i
d^ = annual rate of real depreciation of machinery, buildings, and so forth
1 of firm i- 57 -
countries and even industries within countries, relatively sound
data just at a highly aggregated level is hard to come by. Aggre-
vating the situation are differences in the degree of capital
utilization which itself influenced by a variety of factors like
the day-shift/night shift wage differentials, capital intensity,
scale of production, market structure, management, level of pro-
tection, location, age of plant, proportion of women in work
force, consumer behaviour and other more qualitative determi-
nants .
In an attempt to shed at least some light on the factors which
engender differences in per unit costs of capital, be it between
or among developing and industrialized countries, the ramifica-
tions of policy-imposed capital market distortions on the price
of capital in developing countries and movements in the degree of
capital utilization in industrialized countries are discussed in
the next two sections. This is followed by two case studies; the
first being an international comparison of production costs in
primary textiles (Box 7) , and the second aiming at the basic
intent of this section, namely yielding evidence on the interac-
tion between production costs, factor intensity and export per-
formance, whereby Brazil is used as an example (Box 8).
2. Policy Imposed Capital Market Distortions
Analoguous to the discussion of labor market distortions, with
respect to relative costs of employing labor and capital (chapter
III) , there are three principal channels through which capital
costs can be affected by policies in the capital market. First,
the trade regime may be administered in ways that affect the
relative costs of capital equipment to different users. Second,
there may be interest rate subsidies and credit rationing that
can affect the relative costs of labour and capital to different
industries. Finally, the tax structure and special schemes for
depreciation allowances can effect the relative profitability of
labor-intensive and capital-intensive techniques.- 58 -
Although there are always market imperfections due to information
costs, transaction costs and other frictions associated with the
process of economic growth, direct and indirect interventions
into capital markets have played a major role in developing coun-
tries in comparison to industrialized economies. The relevant
question is whether there have been any significant shifts in
policies in the last twenty years thus systematically influencing
the price of capital and thereby factor proportions between in-
dustries and countries. Of course, only major policy measures can
be identified and correlated here to judge the direction in which
they might have influenced the relative use of capital and labor
in export activities. In turn, this could have been a significant
factor in determining international competitiveness of products
produced for the world market.
Especially under import substitution regimes which prevailed in
most of the developing countries up to the mid - sixties and
still are working in many of these economies, a variety of mecha-
nisms can be identified through which the foreign exchange and
trade regimes affect the overall capital cost relative to labor
cost and also the relative capital cost to different industries.
Perhaps the most important one is the use of a different (and
lower) exchange rate for imports of machinery and equipment than
for other imports. Very often this arises in the context of cur-
rency overvaluation, when most imports are subject to high tariff
rates while capital goods imports enter on low rates of duty or
even duty free. The implicit subsidization of imports of capital
equipment can have different effects on the cost of using capital
for those receiving import permits, depending on the allocation
mechanism, the extent to which domestic capital goods industries
are protected and the range of such goods. Implicit subsidization
of capital goods imports has often tended to favour certain types
of firms, namely large-scale and state-run firms in the organized
sector of the economy. Although it may be that import substitu-
tion tends to offset the higher costs of production of those
goods entailed by their comparative disadvantage it nonetheless
can constitute an implicit subsidy both for capital-using in-
dustries and for the choice of capital-intensive technique.- 59 -
In developing countries, the problem of low income and slov;
growth rates have been associated with a shortage of physical
capital. To be specific capital scarcity encompasses two aspects,
that is to say a country may lack physical capital, but it may
also lack, or be unable to mobilize, the monetary resources to
finance that capital. Many government policies in LDCs are de-
signed to promote fixed capital formation so as to increase the
stock of physical capital. Yet, apparently to ensure that finance
is cheaply available, such policies are frequently accompanied by
government regulation of interest rates in official financial
markets. Since banks are often the sole official providers of
credit to industry, these additional financial policies boil down
to government regulation of bank interest rates which are then
administered at artificial (i.e. mostly below equilibrium) levels
(Table IV.1). In addition foreign borrowing was often cheapened
by overvalued exchange rates.
The implications of such interest rate distortions for the export
activities of the developing countries can be summarized as fol-
lows :
- the relatively high capital intensity of production, fostered
by low interest rate policies especially in the seventies, may
have resulted in a deterioration of competitiveness of export-
ables on world markets. This seems to have happened in most
Latin American countries but also in the African development
region and to a lesser extent in Asian countries (Table AIV.l);
- lower rates of interest have favoured imported investment
goods. This was an incentive to decrease the share of domes-
tically originating inputs and to apply a labor saving techno-
logy which was inappropriate given the abundance of unskilled
labor in most of the industrializing countries. Excess capaci-
ties and a protection structure which provided additional shel-
ter to the scarce factor, capital, were the inevitable conse-
quences .- 60 -
Table IV.1 - Real Rates of Interest






























































































































































































































































































































































Nominal interest rate as indicated minus yearly (actual) change
of the consumer price index. - Real rates of interest on 12-
c d month time deposits. - 1981. - Real rates of interest on 6-
e f
month time deposits. - 1980. - Real rates of interest on sav-
ings deposits. -
 g1963. - 1983- Real rates of interest on 6-
month time deposits. - Real rates on yields of public bonds. -
11966.
Source: Fischer (1982) ; Hanson, Neal (1984) ; IMF (1984) ; Wai
(1972); Agarwal, Dippl, Langhammer (1985); Fischer
(1986); Various National Statistics.- 62 -
Lending rates, which in real terms were lower than the rates of
return on the majority of projects requiring capital, additio-
nally resulted in a crowding out of viable projects because of
credit rationing. Thus, export diversification strategies have
been impeded by wasting scarce resources. Instead of the market
the administration has taken decisions on the allocation of the
funds which might have been misleading because of distorted price
signals. Although the inflow of equity capital for new export
oriented and labor-intensive branches and the promotion of do-
mestic savings are widely accepted targets for developing coun-
tries, just the opposite has happened. The inward-looking indus-
tries, as well as the relatively capital/import intensive ones,
mostly financed through subsidized loans raised on local finan-
cial markets, received strong incentives from low interest rate
policies in a number of developing countries. While some devel-
oping countries seem to have been aware of this incompatibility
between interest subsidization and import diversification strat-
egies and have started to liberalize their financial markets
(efforts in this direction have been undertaken for instance in
Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia - see Table AIV.2 - and more re-
cently in Turkey) most of the developing countries still impose
high taxes on their exports through an inappropriate level of
interest.
The effect of tax incentives on capital costs is straight-for-
ward. Fiscal incentives, reducing taxes otherwise applied to
various types of business income (such as tax holidays lasting
several years, reduction of income or profit tax, tax exemptions
or ceilings, loss-carry-forward provisions, allowances for ac-
celerated depreciation, etc.) can also influence the choice of
techniques. Perhaps the most notable for industrializing coun-
tries concerned tax holidays granted to firms in "priority" (or
pioneer) industries. Because tax holidays are granted to non-
labor returns only, these measures, which are generally intended
to encourage the development of particular industries without
regard to the choice of techniques within them increased incen-
tives for using capital-intensive techniques.- 63 -
Little empirical work has been undertaken to estimate the magni-
tude of capital market distortions or their influence on the on
using capital used in production in developing countries. About
the only piece of relatively systematic evidence is from twelve
countries covered in the National Bureau Project on Alternative
Trade Strategies and Employment .
According to these studies exchange rate overvaluation, coupled
with the reluctance of policymakers to tax imports of capital
goods in a similar fashion to that of other imported goods, has
been a significant factor in contributing to low capital costs
under import substitution regimes; the subsidy implicit in the
pricing of capital goods were estimated to be in the range of
30-40 p.c. For countries which fostered export promotion the pic-
ture is different. Undervaluation of capital goods was generally
avoided by fairly realistically valued currencies.
In contrast to trade regimes, under which import substitution
countries have lowered costs of imported capital equipment more
than export promotion countries, the provision of low-interest
loans to certain industries and credit rationing has been a fea-
ture of all countries. The implicit subsidy involved appears to
have been substantial (exceeding the estimated magnitude of cost
reduction with currency overvaluation in some cases) and consti-
tuted a major source of underpricing of capital services. In
countries with more outward looking development strategies impli-
cit domestic capital subsidies such as low-interest loans or
preferential loans have been destined largely for some of the
sectors associated with their export promotion drive (see Box 5
for Korea and Box 6 for Brazil).
While tax incentives for investment obviously have not played a
signficant role for investment decisions in developing countries
(Galenson, 1984) either an overvalued exchange rate or availabi-
A synthesis and conclusions of these studies can be found in
Krueger (1983).- 64 -
lity of credit at below-market borrowing rates worked in the
direction to induce lower capital costs and provided together
with rising labor costs (resulting mostly from minimum wages and
social legislation) strong incentives for use of capital-inten-
sive production.- 65 -
Box 5
Export Financing in Korea
Given the severe imbalance in Korea's external trade since the
Korean War the government established an export-support financing
system at the beginning of the sixties. This scheme offered pre-
ferential treatment in both the loan amount and the interest
rate. Generally the scheme distinguished between short-term and
long-term financing differentiating between various types of
credit and specifying those eligible to obtain funds. Short-term
financing in most loan types was extended for a period of three
months and its main objective was to provide working capital for
export production. The main objective of long-term financing was
to convert existing industrial capacities suitable for export
production as well as the importation of capital equipment re-
quired in export activities. These loans had an maturity up to 5
years and they were subsidized to a lesser degree than short-term
finance.
Since the introduction of the scheme the largest share of the
funds provided was short-term. This predominance of short-term
loans stemmed from (a) the greater importance of operating capi-
tal (compared to investment capital), and (b) the greater import-
ance of pre-shipment financing of exports over post-shipment
financing of exports (Rhee, 1985, p. 93). As can be seen from
Table IV.2 short-term finance as a share in total export credit
declined continuously during the sixties but the lowest values it
ever reached were still about 60 p.c. during the first half of
the seventies. Measured as a share of total commodity exports
short-term credit amounted to 16.6 p.c. on average of the period
1965 to 1970; between 1971 and 1978 this share was 17.0 p.c. on
the average. Taking into account also long-term finance total
export credit outstanding was 22.1 p.c. and 27.7 p.c, respec-
tively of commodity exports on average of these subperiods. As a
share in manufactured exports total export credit rose from 24.1
p.c. in 1965 to 46.5 p.c. in 1981.
Exports credits could be obtained at highly subsidized interest
rates, especially in the period between the second half of the
sixties and the early seventies. In the case of short-term fi-
nancing the interest rate on these loans was just one-quarter of
that of ordinary bank loans with similar maturity. In the mid-se-
venties this ratio had risen to one-half. Since the introduction
of the export-support financing scheme also a considerable incen-
tive was given to the commercial banks for granting export cred-
its by offering them lower rediscount rates at the Bank of Korea.
While the interest rate subsidy for exporters has been phased out
in mid-1982, the incentive to the commercial banks remained in
effect.
Within the total system of incentives provided to exporters, the
interest rate subsidies on export credit played a substantial
role. According to the calculations of Suh (1981) interest rate























































































































































































Sources: Suh (1981), Rhee (1985), UN, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, various issues.- 67 -
during the late sixties/early seventies (14.6 p.c. on the average
between 1967 and 1971, see Table IV.2). Thereafter they declined
in importance, amounting to 9.2 p.c. on the average of 1972 to
1976. Nevertheless, it could be shown that these subsidies were a
significant determinant in explaining Korea's export performance
at least in the period from 1965 to 1976 (Suh, 1981).- 68 -
Box 6
Export Financing in Brazil
The Central Bank of Brazil currently operates two programs for
the export financing of manufactured goods. With the Fund for
Export Financing (FINEX) manufactured exports in the pre- and
post-shipment stages are financed. FINEX financing is long-term
financing with maturities running from three to eight years.
Since 1972 it was by far the most important fund within the ex-
port financing operations of CACEX, the Foreign Trade Department
of the Central Bank; in the early eighties the share of FINEX-fi-
nance in total CACEX export financing amounted to nearly 8 0 p.c.
(Table IV.3). The rapid increase of FINEX in total CACEX export
financing in 1972 coincides with the introduction of another
export promotion scheme (BEFIEX) in that year. BEFIEX provides a
package of enterprise-specific fiscal incentives for manufactured
exports and it is highly concentrated in a few sectors (transport
equipment, metals and machinery). The FINEX finance system had
also a high concentration in a very few sectors; about 50 p.c.
and 20 p.c. of the pre-shipment credits were concentrated in
shipbuilding and railroad equipment, respectively, at the beginn-
ing of the eighties (World Bank, 1983, p. 63). A similar concen-
tration was found also in the case of post-shipment finance: the
main beneficiaries of these credits were in the sectors "car and
road building equipment" (36 p.c.) and "construction equipment
(13 p.c.) . In all other cases no sector got more than 5 p.c. of
FINEX post-shipment export credit (World Bank, 1983, p. 65).
Available information on FINEX export financing suggests that its
main objective was to provide post-shipment credit. On the
average from 1978 to 1980 FINEX-finance for sales (buyer's and
supplier's credits) amounted to 78.3 p.c. of its total export
credits outstanding while the share of working capital loans was
just 16.1 p.c. (World Bank, 1983, p. 64). However, there is
another main export credit program run by the Central Bank,
Resolution 674, which aims at providing working capital loans for
the production of manufactured exports. Exporters are entitled on
the basis of their exports in the previous year or on their ex-
port commitments subscribed for the current year to receive work-
ing capital loans as a certain proportion of these exports (be-
tween 12 p.c. and 40 p.c. at the beginning of the eighties) . On
the average of 1975 to 1981 export credits under Resolution 674
amounted to 85 p.c. of the credit volume provided by CACEX. Nei-
ther loan amounts nor maturity (one year) have been related to
actual financial needs and time periods of production. Rather the
conceded percentage reflect government priorities and the desire
to promote certain exports (World Bank, 1983, p. 65-66).
Export credits under the Brazilian export financing scheme have
been heavily subsidized. In 1981 the interest rate on FINEX
credits was 7.5 p.c. and 40 p.c. in the case of export credits
under Resolution 674, while the Treasury Bill Rate - as a proxy
for the short-term money market rate - was 88.7 p.c. In any case,
given an inflation rate of 105.6 p.c. in 1981 the real interest- 69 -
rate paid on export credits was highly negative. Within the total
system of export incentives provided interest rate subsidies
became of greater importance in the second half of the seventies.
On the average from 1976 to 1978 they amounted to 14.9 p.c. of
the total subsidies while between 1968 and 1975 the average rate
was 6.7 p.c. (see Table IV.3).
As Table IV. 3 shows total export credit financing has reached
considerable importance in financing manufactured exports since
the mid-seventies. In 1976 and 1977 total outstanding export
credit as a percentage of manufactured exports amounted to over
100 p.c; since then it has declined to 64.2 p.c. in 1981. Never-
theless, these percentages are considerable higher if compared
with those in Korea and in the mid-sixties where this share since
the beginning of the export drive never was above 50 p.c. Referr-
ing to short-term credit supply to the industry export financing
has increased from 7 p.c. to 14 p.c. between 1975 and 1980. For
the industrial sector as a whole this share seems to be small but
given the high concentration of export credits it might have been
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SITC 5 to 8 - (67 + 68). - n.a. = not available.
Source: World Bank (1983).- 71 -
3. Degree of Capital Utilization
The per unit costs of capital can also be significantly affected
by the degree of capital utilization . An increase in the utili-
zation of equipment in manufacturing in the form of longer wor-
king hours per year and per unit of equipment may result (among
other factors) from better management and/or from increased
weekly hours attributable to additional shift work. The decision
of a firm to use shift work or otherwise to lengthen its normal
operating hours of capital depends on certain microeconomic con-
siderations as well as on certain institutional and social fac-
tors. The greater the capital intensity of production, for in-
stance, the greater the incentive to use shift work. Running
extra shifts, however, may extend increases in marginal costs,
the most important of which is labor, for which premiums are
ordinarily paid for work on second or third shifts. Shift work is
encouraged when the price of capital is high in relation to the
price of labor, and the use of it depends also on the ease with
which capital can be substituted for labor in response to a de-
cline in the relative price of capital.
Unfortunately no comparable data are available to show either
whether capital utilization was generally lower in industrial-
izing or in industrialized countries nor if there have been any
significant shifts in the degree of relative idleness of certain
industries in the last twenty years. For instance, as a GATT
(1966) study of textiles in 1964 suggested such developing econo-
mies as those of Hongkong and Taiwan used their capital equipment
for longer hours annually than any of the industrialized coun-
tries. Further, a comparison of the degree of capital utilization
Although this is also true for the degree of capacity utili-
zation, which tended to be lower in developing countries with
import-substitution strategies than in economics with other
trade reimes (Donges, Miiller-Ohlsen, 1978, pp. 78-80), the
unintended idleness of production capacities may be seen as
mainly determined by short-term (demand) factors.- 72 -
in textiles for Israel and the Philippines - also covered by the
GATT study - with more recent data (Bautista et al., 1981) does
not show any significant difference in the machine time worked
during the years 1964 and 1972, respectively. Another comparison
of the degree of capital utilization in spinning and weaving for
1981 (Table IV.4), however, still demonstrates substantial dif-
ferences in the operating hours per year. Despite the variance in
data variability, the available empirical evidence for industria-
lizing countries clearly indicates that variability in levels of
utilization are large and that there is considerable variation
both between industries and within a given industry .
Recent estimates for the USA reveal that the average annual rate
of increase in the work week of capital between 1929 and 1976 was
about 0.47 p.c. (Foss, 1984, p. 12). While from 1948 to the end
of the 1950s, weekly hours changed relatively little, the rate of
increase accelerated in the 1960s and then slowed down. The rise
in weekly hours worked by plants thus has augmented a substantial
increase in the stock of manufacturing capital; from 1948 to 1976
the lengthening in plant hours on an annual basis was about 12
p.c. of the annual increase in the stock of capital. The longer
workweek appears to be a response to the increased capital inten-
sity of production in the postwar years, relative price trends
favoring the substitution of capital for labor and the desire on
the part of the management to use capital more efficiently
through multiple-shift work. This trend to multiple shifts was
accompanied by - and was itself a cause of - the trend in manu-
facturing production away from small firms towards large firms.
The process was also fostered in the USA by decreasing late-shift
wage differentials in relation to straight-time wages over the
past twenty years, which might reflect a changed attitude by
labor toward working at night or a reduction in the real cost of
For an overview of empirical studies on the degree of capital
utilization in developing countries see Winston (1984) .- 73 -
Table IV.4 - Degree of Capital Utilization in Spinning and Weav-
ing for Selected Countries, 1981
Degree of Capital
Utilization Brazil Germany India Japan Korea USA
Shifts per day 3 3 3 3 3 3
Operating hours
per year 6 750 5 800 8 400 6 242 8 200 6 000
Source: ITMF (1981) .
night work because of improved transportation and improved ameni-
ties available in factories. However, one has also to stress that
the increase in the utilization of equipment in manufacturing in
the form of longer hours per year and per unit of equipment was -
according to the estimates made by Foss (1984) - much more due to
better management than to increased weekly hours attributable to
additional shift work.
While empirical evidence for an increasing degree of capital
utilization in the last two decades could also be found for Japan
(Hayes, 1981) recent empirical estimates for the Federal Republic
of Germany led to the result that the average weekly working
hours for fixed capital in the manufacturing sector have been
decreasing between 1960 and 1984 from 67 to 61 hours per week
(Schmidt, 1986a and b). Obviously the trend to shorten the weekly
working hours for labor could not fully be compensated by in-
creased mechanization and automatisation of the production pro-
cess. The enforced remove of capital-intensive production lines
from some European to Asian industrializing countries could thus
at least partly be explained by efforts to maintain the inter-
national competitiveness, because capital can be more intensively
used in these countries due to a greater flexibility in combining
it with labor.- 74 -
Although the findings of an increasing degree of capital utiliz-
ation in the US-manufacturing sector over the last three decades
cannot be generalized for all industrialized countries the future
of shift work in those economies will heavily depend on the le-
gislation to place restrictions on night work as well as on the
trend of technological change. While, for instance, the develop-
ment of large mainframe computers provided a strong incentive to
economize on such capital through shift work, that incentive to
economize is greatly lessend with the development of minicompu-
ters. On the other side, robots, although still representing a
tiny share in the capital stock of industrialized countries, have
the potential for increasing shift work because they will greatly
reduce the wage differential that must be paid for evening and
night work. However, whether the trend of technological change
will continue to be capital using and labor saving, as it seems
to have been in the past, remains to be seen.
For industrializing countries the persistence of high real in-
terest rates in the last few years have sharply increased the
costs of capital. Increased levels of capital utilization could
therefore be a potentially promising way to soften the harsh
effects of rising real interest rates which have been about three
times higher thus far in the 1980s than they were in the decade
of the 1960s. A higher degree of capital utilization in these
countries would not only allow existing capital stocks to serve
as a substitute for new capital investment but also increase the
productivity of new capital as it is installed.- 75 -
Box 7
Production Costs, Factor Intensity and Export Performance;
The Case of Brazil
According to Table II.1 Brazil could keep its export performance
position among industrializing countries between 1965 and 1983
despite of a relatively dramatic increase in physical capital
intensity of exported goods. The observation contradicts with
Standard (Heckscher-Ohlin) trade theory which predicts a negative
relationship between capital intensity, whether human or physi-
cal, and exports in a capital-poor and labor-rich country like
Brazil. While policy imposed distortions both in capital and
labor markets together with the development approach pursued may
have favoured the establishment of capital-intensive industries,
commercial policies could not be identified as the main deter-
minant of the relative successful export performance of the Bra-
zilian economy; it has been stated that the role of the export
incentive system in the seventies has been little more than to
neutralize the average disincentives provided by an overvalued
exchange rate and the level of domestic protection (World Bank,
1983) .
An alternative hypothesis relating capital intensity to export
performance can be derived from industrial economics. If scale
economies are a decisive factor in the allocation of output bet-
ween foreign and domestic markets one would expect this factor to
be more important, ceteris paribus, the more capital-intensive
the techniques of production employed by the firm. Since invest-
ment in physical plant and equipment tend to be indivisible or
"lumpy" a firm operating with capital-intensive techniques will
tend to require a larger market to reduce average costs to a
minimum.
Looking'to the characteristics of the exporting firms in Brazil
there is scattered evidence that a reduction of per unit costs of
output by realizing economies of scale was achieved through
expanding export activities: In fact, Brazilians manufactured
exports have been concentrated in a relatively small number of
big (frequently foreign owned) firms in highly concentrated in-
dustries using more physical capital per employee and experienc-
ing higher factor productivity growth than non-exporting firms
(Silber, 1983) . Although export participation increased less than
proportional with firm size because big firms sold a higher pro-
portion in the domestic market than smaller ones this effect
could be more than compensated when the firm was located in a
concentrated industry. Confronted with a recession in the domes-
tic market, for instance, these firms increased their exports to
benefit further from low per unit production costs by being able
to realize economies of scale. The findings that much of Brazi-
lian manufactured, exports have originated from foreign owned
firms was found to be consistent with the fact that multinatio-
nals have a better knowledge of foreign market conditions, better
distributional channels, service and sale organization which
reduce the otherwise high fixed costs domestic firms are usually
confronted with before starting with export activities (CEPAL,
1985).- 76 -
V. Summary and Concluding Remarks
At the outset of the preceding four sections it was stated that
evidence was to be yielded on the interconnection between distor-
tions in factor markets and performance in world trade. After
noting where forecasts - jnade in the past - of today or the fu-
ture did or will go wrong, i.e. by neglecting or underestimating
the effectiveness of prices in allocating resources and serving
as a signal to entrepreneurs (be they private or public) where
investments are relatively lucrative, evidence was presented on
where distortions led to a poorer economic performance or where
their removal produced positive economic benefits. While the
results are not unequivocal in the sense that indisputable facts
have been presented for the entire sample of countries, there was
nonetheless no general evidence that a greater involvement, by the
state in influencing relative factor prices leads to a better
performance in export markets.
As a matter of fact one of those countries long upheld as a prime
example of how to develop quickly and efficiently with an open
economy and relatively undistorted factor markets, Singapore, has
clearly been experiencing the feedback of its own policies "to go
against the market". That is to say, in 1979 the Government com-
menced policies to raise wages faster than (average) productivity
so as to squeeze out those industries with low productivitiy
2
levels . It was felt that such industries should not remain in
the City-State, where high-tech establishments were supposed to
chart the future course of the economy.
It would be incorrect to assume that just because a company is
state-run it follows different entrepreneurial principles than
a private one - it is just a matter of ensuring that the same
incentive structure exists.
2
This policy also included specific reductions in the use of
foreign laborers, since they were usually employed in the high-
ly labor-intensive industries.- 77 -
The above policy (along with other influences) resulted in a
rapid shift in relative unit labor costs to the disadvantage of
Singapore. This verdict is easily deduced from Table V.I. Thus
having worked their way through the system the increased labor
costs not only led to exports becoming less competitive, invest-
ment also fell off and-GDP fell in 1985 for the first time in
over 20 years . The current outlook for 1986 is hardly any more
encouraging as GDP is expect to decline still further. Although
official reactions so far have been towards providing additional
incentives and reducing taxes, it remains to be seen whether more
sweeping reforms will instill the degree of flexibility into the
system which Hong Kong still possess. Or rather whether the pro-
ductivity increases are forthcoming to the same degree as in the
case of Korea, which was even able to increase its competitive
position over time.
Table V.I - Singapore's Unit Labor Costs
a Relative to Asian Com-


















































Source: Own calculations based on Far Eastern Economic Review,
March 27, 1986 and GATT.
Employment in construction and manufacturing suffered a de-
crease of almost 20%. Together the two sectors account for
about one third of total employment in Singapore.- 78 -
The problems encountered by Singapore's strategy to force a
speedy restructuring of its economy according to a preconceived
development path instead of merely ensuring that it can effi-
ciently fulfill its potential role in the international division
of labor, highlights the central issues surrounding the function-
ing of factor markets in light of changing or rather more rapidly
changing comparative advantages. Drawing on the evidence present-
ed earlier, Singapore's current tribulations should not be sur-
prising but rather expected.
If, as in the case of Panama with its (per labor code) tightly
restricted labor market, demand by the private sector for labor
has been reduced to but a minor contribution , then structural
adjustment will occur via more capital intensive methods. What
this implies for exports of manufacturers (assuming other coun-
tries do not intervene in labor markets to the same degree) is
that they will become less competitive and more capital inten-
sive. Knowing that Panama as well as many other developing coun-
tries do not have the same ease of access to capital they had
before, this path is limited by financial constraints. To the
degree that foreign capital cannot be attracted in the form of
2
direct investment , then investments will be reduced, activities
shifted into labor intensive areas with lower skill levels domi-
nated (e.g. personal services) or rather into areas where the
impact of the regulations has been softened with government ap-
proval (i.e. in the offshore banking sector). Outside official
activities the underground economy - free of policy-imposed dis-
tortions - will of course profit, but it can hardly be expected
that the underground economy will be able to assume the role in
foreign trade, which the official economy would. Given the impact
of the Labor Code on growth, investment and exports to date
It should be remembered that 75% of the growth of employment in Panama from
the early seventies to the mid-eighties was accounted for by the public
sector.
2
With measures like the Labor Code companies politely decline to invest,
realizing how large the potential financial risk can become. That is, they
critically evaluated the impact of not being able to flexibly adjust employ-
ment levels to production needs without effecting payments, which increase
with seniority.- 79 -
(see Panama Box) and in light of increasing employment problems,
policymakers already have and will be forced to make decisions to
loosen key regulations in order to be better prepared to react to
shifts in world demand and production patterns.
Although this is concluded from Panama's experience, there are
indications from numerous other countries, that distortions in
factor markets are being reduced or at least increased attention
is being given to their impact . Thus minimum wages in Latin
America and Africa have become subjected to benign neglect and
not raised, extended or controlled to the extent this was done
earlier. Likewise, policymakers are becoming aware of the impact
of interest rate distortions and attempted in various countries
to allow the scarcity of capital to better reflect the rate of
interest charged and (in particular) given.
Unfortunately not all countries are blessed by the locational
advantages which have contributed to Panama's relatively prosper-
ous level of development and in the past veiled-over the underly-
ing problems. It is therefore all the more necessary for coun-
tries like Bangladesh, which are blessed neither by locational
advantages nor by natural resources and are on the bottom rungs
of the development ladder, to realize how essential it is for
factor markets to remain relatively undistorted and to allow
entrepreneurs to tap the comparative advantages of the country.
Although Bangladesh's economy is quite distorted they are already
in the fortunate position of having learned what benefits can be
forthcoming by allowing an industry (in this case the clothing
industry) to efficiently produce for world markets. That they
were successful was attested to by the quotas several industrial-
ized countries - in particular the United States - imposed upon
them.
Even in Taiwan efforts are being made to have labor laws chang-
ed to allow more flexibility.- 80 -
Although there can be no doubt that Bangladesh's comparative
advantages are in labor-intensive areas of production, there is a
certain amount of hesitancy among some economists to recommend
proceding along a continuum known as a development path. First of
all the above reaction by industrialized countries is interpreted
as meaning that labor-intensive exports will be up against in-
creased protectionism from developed countries. Secondly, the
types of products manufactured usually contain only a nominal
share of inputs from the domestic economy (i.e. basically wages)
and thus are seen as providing but few impulses in the form of
linkages. Third, production techniques for such items are in the
process of shifting away from using low-skilled labor to incor-
porating robots and computer assisted assembly. All this means
that such industries or rather even trade with industrialized
countries leads down a path which does little to help a country
increase the welfare of its citizens.
While it does seem to be true that protectionism has become a
greater problem over the last years, generally speaking the share
of developing countries's exports in consumption of industrializ-
ed countries has nonetheless been steadily increasing over time.
Protectionism, as a matter of fact, even seems to have back-fired
on those nations, which attempted to keep an efficient allocation
resources from occurring. That is, those countries continually
subjected to protectionistic measures, became more flexible and
adept at shifting to different lines of production. Thus Hong
Kong, which was recently hit particularly hard by new domestic
content rules imposed upon them by the United States, has in the
meantime restructured production and can now produce the same
articles of clothing more competitively .
The rule in essence barred clothing from being exported to the
US from Hong Kong if it mainly consisted of components produced
elsewhere and assembled in Hong Kong. This effectively barred
the use of having some items e.g. produced in China to be sewn
together in Hong Kong. The clothing industry (among other
things) purchased automatic knitting machines to do the job and
can now carry out the entire process at lower costs in Hong
Kong (Asian Wall Street Journal, Jan. 3/4, 1986).- 81 -
The fact that an allocation of factors of production in line with
their relative scarcities can result in export industries with
only low shares of domestic content, is not a disadvantage per
se. It merely expresses the understandable condition that at low
levels of development the necessary capital and human capital
inputs are not available from domestic sources and that a stra-
tegy to rapidly generate them would imply using financial resour-
ces which could otherwise be put to more efficient use. In es-
sence the argument against relying on such industries represents
Singapore's attempt "to go against the market", the implications
of which were explained above.
For sure there were many other countries which attempted to in-
stitute and carry out policies aimed specifically at increasing
the domestic content of exports and moving up-market to less
labor-intensive products. India and Brazil are two prominent but
differing examples of such countries. Brazil, for instance, exhi-
bited a strong export performance and a shift in factor inten-
sities towards physical and human capital industries. India re-
vealed the same shift but had a poor export performance. Aside
from the fact that Brazil achieved a sizeable share of success by
harnessing the exports of multinational corporations (in capital-
intensive areas) they continued to export in labor-intensive
areas as evidenced by their performance in manufacturing shoes .
India, on the other hand, did not encourage foreign direct in-
vestments and made access to foreign inputs difficult. Its top
position among the textile exporters in 1965 shrank to an also-
ran in 1983, no doubt to a large degree due to lack of access to
foreign machinery inputs. Thus while India may have succeeded in
creating relatively high domestic contents in the products they
produce the export performance does not bespeak of being compe-
From position 42 among all countries exporting shoes to the
world in 1965 to number 10 in 1973, number 7 in 1978 and number
4 in 1983 Brazil built up a competitive, labor-intensive shoe
industry by opening up access to duty-free imported inputs,
loans and other export incentives (see Box 6).- 82 -
titive in international markets. It would not be incorrect to
state that they traded off the additional income they could have
received by allowing labor and capital (plus foreign inputs) to
be combined in an efficient manner for lower income but higher
domestic content levels.
The final point concerning the impact of new technologies is not
without a grain of salt, but to conclude therefrom that ineffi-
cient methods (i.e. not in line with factor intensities) of pro-
duction should be instituted would hardly be correct. For sure
the textile and now also the clothing industries have been en-
gaged in major technological advances in recent years. Further-
more the highly labor-intensive electronic assembly industries
are moving towards elimination of many tedious, low-skill, labor-
intensive processes by using smart robots. However, the past has
shown that although such leaps in technology cause temporary
economic difficulties, the longer term has always accommodated
the leaps without difficulty. It would therefore contradict all
prior experience to assume that the present phase of applying
computer technology to an ever increasing spectrum of production
processes is a step in a new direction. Although such a major
shift cannot be excluded, at present - and in the near future -
at least this "danger" is not apparent.
Since the above evidence underlines the importance of maintaining
a competitive position in foreign trade via allowing factors of
production to be paid relative to their abundance in an economy,
it is concluded that recent major advances in technology are best
countered by ensuring that increased flexibility is promoted. If
changes are occurring more rapidly now, then economies which
attempt to nail down certain wage relationships or are intent on
moving in one predetermined direction will find their economic
well-being suffering, as world trade flows bypass them. By conti-
nually interacting with impulses from abroad and efficiently
taking advantage of economic opportunities the validity of pes-
simistic forecasts made today about tomorrow will be just as
wrong as they were shown to be in the past.- 83 -
APPENDIX I
Indices of Effective Changes in Nominal and Real Exchange Rates
and Exchange Restrictions
Background and_Relevance
With the passing of the gold standard or rather the Bretton Woods
System and concomitantly with the dawning of more flexible ex-
change rate adjustments, effective (i.e. weighted) changes in the
value of a country's currency vis-a-vis the world or its trading
partners became difficult to judge. Although this problem already
always existed under fixed exchange rates, when inflation differ-
entials caused real exchange rates to shift from officially pegg-
ed rates, it wasn't until discussion in the course of the sixties
about mitigating/solving or reacting to balance of payments dis-
equilibria generated the framework for indices of effective ex-
change rate changes (Hirsch, Higgins, 1970) . The index was in-
tended to "illustrate one particular influence - that__ejna.nating
from exchange rate _changejs _JI__p_n internajtional competitiveness"
(Hirsch, Higgins, p. 458). Later elaborations extended the con-
cept to interface exchange rate changes with reaction parameters
J
for individual countries within an exchange rate model in order
to attempt to measure the J^tj^_ juinpaj^t.__of ^_^^
interacted with the domestic and international economies (Artus,
Rhomberg, 1973). Basically, however, most indices used today
incorporate only the exchange rate changes with a weighting
scheme and - in the case of real exchange rate changes - price
indices.
Given the prime aim of such an index, namely to illustrate
changes in international competitiveness, it is an essential link
For an overview of the problems connected with such indices,
particularly as concerns their purpose, areas of use and inter-
pretation, see Rhomberg (1976) and Maciejewski (1983).- 84 -
in interpreting developments in domestic markets and comparing
them with those in international markets. That is, an exchange
rate which - in real terms - is allowed to appreciate by not
adjusting for domestic price increases relative to other coun-
tries, will make exportables less and less competitive even if
domestic factor markets have allowed relative scarcities to be
reflected in relative prices. Hence performance in world trade
will - ceteris paribus - be negatively influenced.
However, information about effective changes of real exchange
rates per se is not always sufficient to allow domestic price
developments to be related or correctly related to export trends.
That is to say, the degree to which access to foreign exchange is
restricted, complicated or even made more costly, can very well
serve as a detriment to expanding exports (see e.g. comments in
text on export financing). Although entrepreneurs often find way?
of avoiding many such regulations, neither the time and resources
invested in such activities nor the solution itself can be con-
sidered to be efficient and thus beneficial in permitting a coun-
try to tap its economic potential. Table AI.1 provides an over-
view of major types of measures which can act as such barriers.
Method
•• H ^ _• -— •— J
The effective real exchange rate chancres (ERERC) used in this
paper have been calculated by applying the formula on the page
86. It is similar to most other straight-forward ERERC formulas,
differing basically in the weighting scheme (shares in world
trade are used) and in delineating between exports and imports.
The advantage of the former - as opposed to using only bilateral
weights - is that the change in the total competitive position
vis-a-vis all actual and potential trading partners is picked up.
That is, the change in the relative prices is not limited to
Calculations for effective changes in the nominal exchange rate
are much performed without price indices.Table AI. 1 - Overview
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given trading partners (i.e. bilateral trade shares). The latter ,
does justice to the simple fact that, e.g. after a devaluation,
the price for exports - expressed in foreign currency units per
domestic currency unit - d,eccea'ses less than the price for im- X
ports - expressed as the reciprocal of the above.
The symbols in the formula represent the following variables:
ERERC
1 = effective real exchange rate changes for country i
between time t and t + n vis-a-vis countries
j = 1 . . . m
ER = exchange rate
IM = total world imports




EX = total world exports
EX
1 1
_vj = total exports for countries i and j
= export or consumer price index for country i and j.
The first part of the expression - A. - represents the ERERC for
exports of country i; the second part of the expression - B.. -
represents the ERERC for the imports of country i. A_ and B_ are
the export and import shares respectively for country i (% of sum
of exports plus imports) with which both parts are weighted to
produce ERERC for total foreign trade.
The 73 countries used in the calculations with the real exchange
rates are listed on page 88. The results of the calculations see
Table AI.2.
Average for years 1970 and 1971.- 88 -
The data has been taken from IMF International Financial Statis-
tics . The base year from which all exchange rate changes were
calculated is 1970.











































































VenezuelaTable A 1.2 - Effective Changes in Nominal iind Real Exchanges Rates










































































































































































































































































































aA minus (-) sign indicates a devaluation. All changes vis-a-vis 1970. - The ranking of industrializing countries is
determined by value of exports in 1983. The number in ( ) represents the rank in 1965; for method and procedures see Ap-
pendix I. - Data for 1966.
Source: Own calculations based on data from IMF.- 90 -
APPENDIX II
The Factor Intensity of Exports - Background and Method
Background
The degree to which countries specialize in the production of
goods in line with their posited comparative advantages is a key
issue in international trade theory, because it determines whe-
ther the factors of production (assuming they are otherwise not
influenced) are being efficiently allocated. Roughly speaking, an
industrializing country, with no major supplies of natural re-
sources and with labor more plentiful than capital, would be
expected to specialize in labor-intensive methods of production.
A high income country, on the other hand, would - given a rela-
tively more abundant supply of capital than labor - be expected
to concentrate on more capital-intensive methods of production.
In the course of development (and simplifying international trade
theory) production in a given country is perceived shifting to a
more intensive use of factors of production whose relative supply
increases and relative prices become more attractive. Hence, as
wages increase due to a strong demand for labor, higher skills
become sought after and more capital and/or human capital methods
of production are installed. This is a never ending process,
which basically describes the development path for industrializ-
ing as well as for industrialized countries (i.e. the development
path is assumed to be a continuum). Although - as explained here
- those cases where raw materials or highly research/technology
intensive products are concerned have been neglected, their in-
clusion in essence merely broadens the concept factors of pro-
duction, without changing the basic principles. It can be gener-
ally stated that most trade between market or mixed economies in
the real world today follows such principles .
One crucial condition in this framework is that between coun-
tries the relative position of an industry's factor intensity
does not shift from being capital-intensive in one country to
being labor intensive in another (i.e. factor reversals are
excluded). Should such events occur it is often assumed that
policy influences can be held responsible (such condition in-
duce so-called policy-induced goods).- 91 -
Given the above stated relevance in determining whether a country
has allowed production to be efficiently structured, economists
have invested considerable resources in attempting to analyze
trade flows with respect to their factor intensity. From the
first straightforward attempt by Leontief (1953), through Lary's
(1968) extensive analysis of the proper approach to the most
recent literature (see for instance Lee, 1986) , the problem of
how. to measure the factor intensity of foreign trade is a key
issue. Since many countries do not have data which allow factor
intensities to be calculated from direct (and also indirect)
factor inputs, substitutes must be found. The availability of the
data has led many to resort to using value added per employee for
physical capital intensity (as a substitute for physical capital
assets per employee) and wages per employee for human capital
intensity (as a substitute for more explicit skill indicators) -
both based on Lary's analysis. Since often even such data is not
available for the period under considerations, proxies of factor
intensities for individual industries are drawn from a specific
country where it is felt that factor prices and hence factor
intensities roughly reflect factor endowments. The latter ap-
proach assures that the information on the crucial factor inten-
sity side of the issue is on a strong statistical foundation -
only the weighting scheme need be devised. This is usually based
on the structure of trade and can be calculated relatively easi-
ly.
Method
The calculations on the factor intensity of exports presented in
this paper are based on data from the 1980 US survey of manufac-
tures. While the use of such data from a highly industrialized
country hardly seems like an appropriate approach to determine
whether the exports of a fledgling industrializing country cor-
respond to its hypothesized comparative advantages, the method
(as noted above) is legitiment, given adherence to some basic- 92 -
conditions in mainstream international trade theory . In this
connection it is important to realize that the United States can
be considered to be a relatively open country, where relative
factor intensities are roughly in line with posited levels.
Although indigeneous factor intensities from each country would
allow a direct read-out of the actual factor intensity for each
individual country, such data unfortunately do not exist for all
countries in the sample. Assuming the above assumption about the
openess of the US, it was decided against drawing factor inten-
sities from an industrializing country, where the impact of spe-
cific industrialization policies could more severely distort
factor intensities from levels reflecting the factor endowment in
the country. In using the US data it must thus be noted that the
calculated factor intensities of exports only reflect the rela-
tive factor intensities based on the (e.g. industrial) structure
of exports - no information about the actual (absolute) factor
intensity of exports is revealed. This means that although the
policy-induced shifts into certain (e.g. capital-intensive) sec-
tors will be picked up, the actual induced factor intensities
will not. Nonetheless the former bit of information is sufficient
for this study.
To ensure that reality does not differ significantly from hypo-
thesized relationships, factor intensities by industry from indi-
geneous data were calculated for Malaysia, the Philippines, Sin-
gapore and Taiwan (around 1973). The ensuing results were corre-
lated (i.e. using Pearson correlation coefficients) with US data
from the same period of time (i.e. 1973) and it was determined
that - generally speaking - a highly significant correlation of
at least .75 was engendered for at least one of the functional
forms (see Appendix Table AII.l). With these results in mind it
seems quite reasonable to assume that factor intensities from
United States data sufficiently reflect "true" factor intensities
in industrializing countries.
In other studies India, Japan and the Benelux countries have
been used.- 93 -
Table AII.l - Pearson Correlation Coefficients between US Capital






















US, Singapore and Malaysian data from 1973; Taiwan is from 1976
and the Philippines from 1975.
Source: Own calculations based on national sources.
The two indicators used - physical capital intensity (capital
assets/employee - CAPINT) and human capital intensity (wages/em-
ployee - HCINT) - are in line with standard procedures. Although
some adjustments have to be made to the US data to make it com-
parable with standard ISIC definitions, the disaggregated level
of the data permitted this without difficulty (see Table All.2).
The indices were calculated for a year towards the beginning of
the period 1965-1983 (i.e. 1968) and for one towards the end
(i.e. 1980). The factor intensity indicators were then multiplied
with the export shares of the 28 industries (excluding 353 and
354 - see Table AIII.2) in total exports of the 28 industries.
These factor intensities were then rebased relative to the United
States to allow conclusions to be drawn about relative perform-
ance over time. Although primarily 1980 figures were used
throughout the study, the 1968 figures portray almos,t the same
pattern and can be supplied upon request. The basic reason for
applying the 1980 data was its relevance for current trends.
As noted in Section II in the text, SITC data were converted
into ISIC data for all countries. The authors are fully aware
of the problems associated with using data run through a SITC-
ISIC concordance. The results throughout the study are thus
interpreted with caution.- 94 -

















323 Leather Prods. Ex Footwear
324 Footwear
331 Wood, Cork Prods.
332 Furniture, Fixtures
341 Paper, Paper Prods.
342 Printing,Publishing etc.
351 Industrial Chemicals
352 Other Chemical Prods.
353 Petroleum Refined
354 Petrol, Coal Prods.
355 Rubber Prods.
356 Plastic Prods. N.E.S.
361 Pottery, China, Earthernware
362 Glass, Glass Prods.
369 Nonmetal Mineral Prods.
371 Basic Iron, Steel Inds.
372 Nonferrous Metal Inds.
380 Cutlery, Tools, Hardware
381 Metal Prods. Ex Machinery
382 Machinery Ex Electrical
383 Elect. Machinery, Supplies
384 Transport Equipment























































































































12407 29710 7097 16387
aThe reader is referred to the respective UN publication for complete industry
description. Fixed assets/employee in US$. - °Wages/employees in US$.
Source: Own calculations based on US Department of Commerce (1972, Table 1;















































































































































































































































































For method of calculation see Appendix II. Following these calculations the actual factor intensities in US$
were - for the year 1965 - expressed in % of the 1965 factor intensity for the United States. That is, the
year 1965 represents the factor intensity of exports of a given country relative to the United States. The
values for the years 1973 and 1983 are all relative to 1965 so that the development of each country can be
individually followed over time. - The number in () represents the ranking within the same set of countries
in 1965. The ranking in this table is determined by the total value of ncn-oil manufactured exports in 1983.-
c 1980 capital assets/employee; in 1,000s of US dollars. - 1980 wages/enployee; in 1,000s of US dollars.
Source: Own calculations based on trade data from UNCTAD and factor intensity data from the US Department of
Commerce (1982a and 1982b).










































































































































































































































































For method of calculation see Appendix II. Following these calculations the actual factor intensities in US$ were - for
the year 1965 - expressed in % of the 1965 factor intensity for the United States. That is, the year 1965 represents the fac-
tor intensity of exports of a. given country relative to the United States. The values for the years 1973 and 1983 are all re-
lative to 1965 so that the development of each country can be individually followed over time. - T?he ranking of the indus-
trializing countries is determined by value of manufactured exports in 1983. The number in ( ) is ranking in 1965 . - Capi-
tal assets per employee (1,000 US$) from 1980 US data. - "Ttfages per employee (1,000 US$) from 1980 US data.
Source: Own calculations based on trade data from UNCTAD and factor intensity data from US Department of Connerce (1982a and
1982b).- 97 -
Table A III. 1 - Overview of Types of Free Economic Activity Zones
Type of Zone Specifics (1); Delineation (2a); Application (2b); Expected
impact (3); Examples (4)









1. Tariffs, import taxes and indirect taxes not applied.
2a. Locational delineation.
2b. Applies to goods entering domestic custom area or entering
entering with a delay.
3. Serves transshipment/storage and processing/manufacturing
of goods.
4. Free port in Hamburg, bonded warehouses in Bangladesh and
Malaysia, free trade zones in U.S. and other similar
facilities in many countries.
1. Tariffs and indirect taxes eliminated.
2a. Delineation based on object of economic activity.
2b. Applies to persons living abroad and/or going abroad.
3. Increases domestic sales and - to the extent the domestic
goods are concerned - domestic production.
4. Duty free shops at airports or in special stores (e.g.,
Philippines), rebates for tourists at borders.
1. Elimination of minimum reserves requirements, interest rate
regulations, exchange controls, etc.
2a. Delineation based on object of economic activity.
2b. Applies to foreign customers or to customers accessing
foreign markets.
3. Increases international competitive position of domestic
banks or makes country more attractive for foreign invest-
ments .
4. Euromarket banks, i.e., Luxembourg, London, New York,
Panama.
1. Elimination of restrictive, state-imposed insurance
regulations.
2a. Delineation based on object of economic activity.
2b. Applies to foreign customers.
Increases international competitive position of domestic
insurance companies.
Lloyds of London, New York Free Insurance Zone.
3.
4.
1 . Elimination of tariffs, direct/indirect taxes, distortions export
in factor/financial markets and bureaucratic red tape.
2a. Locational delineation.
2b. Applies to production of products to be exported.
3. Promotes economic development of a country via increased
employment/labour incomes, technology/know-how transfer and
demand for domestic inputs.
4. Bangladesh, Shannon (Ireland), Malaysia, South Korea, Sri
Lanka.
1. Elimination of taxes, tariffs, important distortions.
2a. Locational delineation.
2b. Applies to all research development, production and end-use
activities in a zone.
3. Promotes economic development in an otherwise distorted
economy.
4. The closest example would be Hong Kong.
Source: Spinanger (1985).- 98 -
Table AIV.1 - Price Distortions and Export Growth of Selected



































































































































































































Turkey 1.7 H M 2.14
aH = High, M = Medium, L = Low. - Includes also indices for
other distortions in foreign exchange and product pricing.
Source: Agarwala (1983).Table AIV.2 - Pricing of Bank Credit, Loan Restrictions and Exchange Controls in Selected Asian Countries




Pricing of Bank Credit
- Lending rates still fixed by govt. but from
Nov. 84 rates may be set within a narrow
range (10 % - 11.5 *,)
- Legal maximum lending rates set by Rankers'
Ass. of Taipei (floors and ceilings; "Prime
rate" system of March 85 permitted 5 big banks
to vary lending rate within narrow range.
Credit Allocation/Preferential Lending
- Preferential credit allocation by banks stopped
Nov. 84, but preferential rediscounting still
available from Central Bank.
- Central Bank offers extensive preferential
acccmodation for export financing, etc.
Exchange Rate Controls
- Exchange controls remain in forcn.
Capital flows highly restricted.
- NT $ not convertible for residents.






Oct. 78: Bank lending rates freed, except to
priority sectors; Nov 83: Base lending rate
introduced.
July 75: Bank lending rates freed from fixing
by Ass. of Banks
Legal interest rate ceilings still apply;
Jan. 83. = Bank lending ceiling lowered for
first time (to 17,5 % from 19 %); March 83:
"Prime rate" introduced for overdrafts at
more favourable rates; 1984: Preferential
lending rates apply to priority sectors
Annual guidelines for founding priority sectors
still enforced; 1984 (1982): 31 ft (51 %)
of loans to prioritv sectors.
1974 -75 = Selective credit controls
directives on loan growth and sectoral
allocation abolished 1975
Banks of Thailand supplies concessionary
credit (e.g. for foreign exports; 1983/84
= Bank credit growth restricted to 18 %.
June 78 = Exchange control
abolished
Foreign exchange control largely
in abeyance.
June 83: Credit ceilings on all commercial
banks (State, private, national and foreign)
lifted.
Source: Greenwood (1985, adapted from tables 1-7)- 100 -
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